江西财经大学学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (1): 90-101.

• “三农”研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

地方政府何以稳粮:官员激励的政治经济学分析

甘林针, 钟钰, 普蓂喆   

  1. 中国农业科学院 农业经济与发展研究所,北京 100081
  • 收稿日期:2022-06-30 修回日期:2022-11-30 发布日期:2023-02-15
  • 通讯作者: 普蓂喆,中国农业科学院副研究员,管理学博士,主要从事粮食安全与支持政策研究,联系方式pumingzhe@caas.cn。
  • 作者简介:甘林针,中国农业科学院博士研究生,主要从事粮食安全与支持政策研究;钟钰,中国农业科学院研究员,管理学博士,主要从事粮食安全、农产品贸易研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目“粮食安全省长责任制下的地方政府粮食生产保障行为及机制研究”(21BJY131); 国家社会科学基金重大项目“耕地-技术-政策融合视角的‘两藏'战略研究”(21ZDA056); 中国农业科学院科技创新工程项目(10-IAED-01-2022)

With What Can Local Governments Stabilize Grain Production A Political Economical Analysis of Officials' Incentives

GAN Lin-zhen, ZHONG Yu, PU Ming-zhe   

  1. Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Beijing 100081, China
  • Received:2022-06-30 Revised:2022-11-30 Published:2023-02-15

摘要: 确保粮食安全,不仅要保护农民种粮积极性,还要激发地方政府稳粮积极性。我国粮食生产取得重大成就,离不开地方政府和主政官员的贯彻落实。通过官员激励,确保中央与地方在粮食治理上目标一致,是政策落实的重要方面,但鲜有研究关注。以晋升锦标赛理论为基础,利用2003—2019年31个省份面板数据构建官员晋升模型,从官员激励角度分析提高地方政府稳粮积极性的路径,考察粮食生产绩效是否是官员晋升的要素之一。结果显示,粮食生产绩效利于主产区官员晋升,而对产销平衡区、主销区和全样本的官员晋升作用不显著,稳健性检验和内生性检验也验证了这一结论。证实在粮食生产“主战场”的主产区,地方官员稳粮晋升通道已建立,晋升锦标赛是稳定粮食生产的重要机制。未来应优化粮食安全省长责任制考核体系,提高官员在保障粮食安全工作的激励精准度和针对性;强化地方粮食安全考核结果运用,提高粮食安全官员激励强度;增强地方党政官员的稳粮责任意识,落实粮食安全党政同责。

关键词: 粮食生产, 官员晋升, 晋升锦标赛, 粮食安全省长责任制

Abstract: To ensure grain security, it is not only necessary to protect farmers' enthusiasm to grow grain, but also to stimulate local governments' enthusiasm to stabilize grain production. The significant achievements in grain production in China cannot be achieved without the implementation by local governments and key officials. Ensuring that the central and local governments share the same goals in grain governance through official incentives is an important aspect of policy implementation, but little research has focused on it. Based on the promotion tournament theory, this paper makes use of the panel data of 31 provinces from 2003 to 2019 to construct an official promotion model. Then it analyzes the paths to improve the motivation of local governments to stabilize grain production from the perspective of official incentives and examines whether grain production performance is one of the elements of official promotion. The findings show that grain production performance is conducive to official promotion in the grain-producing regions. In contrast, it is not significant for the promotion of officials in the grain production and marketing balance areas, the main marketing areas and the full samples. This conclusion is verified by the robustness test and the endogeneity test. It is confirmed that in the main grain-producing regions, a channel has been established for local officials to be promoted through stabilizing grain production, and the promotion tournament is an important mechanism to stabilize grain production. In the future, we should optimize the provincial governor responsibility system for grain security, improve the incentive accuracy and pertinence of officials in ensuring grain security, strengthen the use of local grain security assessment results, improve the incentive intensity of grain security officials, enhance the sense of responsibility for stabilizing grain production of the local Party and government officials, and implement the same responsibilities of the Party and government officials in grain security .

Key words: grain production, official promotion, promotion tournament, provincial governor responsibility system for grain security

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