财政“省直管县”改革与地方政府财政违规——基于财政治理和审计治理的实证研究

当代财经 ›› 2022, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (2): 41-53.

财政“省直管县”改革与地方政府财政违规——基于财政治理和审计治理的实证研究

朱莹, 黄轲

广东财经大学金融学院,广东广州 510320

收稿日期:2021-07-04 修回日期:2022-01-05 出版日期:2022-02-15 发布日期:2022-02-22
通讯作者: 黄轲,广东财经大学讲师,经济学博士,主要从事公司金融研究,联系方式gdufe_hk@163.com
作者简介:朱莹,广东财经大学讲师,经济学博士,主要从事财政与金融研究
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学基金项目“中国财政分权体系下的地方环境治理问题及对策研究”（19YJC790003）; 广东省自然科学基金面上项目“宏观审慎政策作用于系统性金融风险的理论机制、时变效应及政策优化研究”（2020A1515010863）

The Fiscal Reform of“Province-Managing-County”and the Fiscal Violations of Local Governments: An Empirical Study Based on Fiscal Governance and Audit Governance

ZHU Ying, HUANG Ke

Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China

Received:2021-07-04 Revised:2022-01-05 Online:2022-02-15 Published:2022-02-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 财政治理和审计治理皆为政府治理体系的基础和重要组成部分。以财政“省直管县”改革为契机,研究了财政治理和审计治理两种政府治理方式对地方政府财政违规的影响。研究发现,财政“省直管县”改革提高了县级政府财政违规金额,但该影响会在5年内逐渐衰减直至消失。机制分析表明,改革在短期内引起的审计监管放松是县级政府财政违规金额上升的主要原因,而审计监管环境趋严和审计技术效率的提高能够有效约束其财政违规行为;缺乏证据支持财政激励是改革影响县级政府财政违规行为的渠道。进一步的研究发现,财政“省直管县”改革也会提高地级市政府财政违规金额,但其影响机制主要是不参与县级税收分成和丧失财政截留机会而产生的财政激励。因此,建议平衡政府间财政分权关系,提高审计质量和审计独立性,重视财政体制改革和政府审计体制改革的政策协调。

关键词: 财政“省直管县”, 财政违规, 财政治理, 审计治理

Abstract: Fiscal governance and audit governance are the foundation and important components of the government governance system. This paper takes advantage of the“Province-Managing-County”(PMC) finance reform to explore the impact of these two forms of government governance on local government fiscal violations. The findings show that the fiscal PMC reform can significantly increase the amount of fiscal violations by county governments, but this effect will decrease gradually and fade away in 5 years. The mechanical analysis indicates that the increase of the amount of fiscal violations by county-level governments is mainly due to the loosening of audit supervision restrictions caused by reform in a short term, while the audit supervision environment being strict and the improvement of audit technology efficiency can effectively restrict the fiscal violation behaviors. There is no evidence to support that fiscal incentives are the channels through which the reform affect the fiscal violations of county-level governments. Further study finds out that the fiscal PMC reform can also increase the amount of fiscal violations by prefecture city governments; however, its influencing mechanism is mainly due to the fiscal incentives generated by not participating in the county-level tax sharing or losing of fiscal interception opportunities. Therefore, it is suggested to balance the fiscal decentralization relationship between governments, improve audit quality and audit independence, and pay attention to the policy coordination of fiscal system reform and government audit system reform.

Key words: province managing county finance, fiscal violation, fiscal governance, audit governance

中图分类号:

F812.7

朱莹, 黄轲. 财政“省直管县”改革与地方政府财政违规——基于财政治理和审计治理的实证研究[J]. 当代财经, 2022, 0(2): 41-53.

ZHU Ying, HUANG Ke. The Fiscal Reform of“Province-Managing-County”and the Fiscal Violations of Local Governments: An Empirical Study Based on Fiscal Governance and Audit Governance[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2022, 0(2): 41-53.

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