联合调研网络与企业创新投入——基于机构投资者实地调研的经验证据

当代财经 ›› 2021, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (3): 88-99.

联合调研网络与企业创新投入——基于机构投资者实地调研的经验证据

王乐^1,2, 田高良^1,3, 封华⁴, 吴璇⁵

1.西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安 710049;
2.西安明德理工学院经济与管理学院,陕西西安 710124;
3.西安交通大学管理教学实验中心,陕西西安 710049;
4.西北工业大学管理学院,陕西西安 710109;
5.哈尔滨工业大学（深圳）经济管理学院,广东深圳 518055

收稿日期:2021-01-05 修回日期:2021-02-10 出版日期:2021-03-15 发布日期:2021-03-16
通讯作者: 王乐,西安交通大学在读博士生、西安明德理工学院副教授,主要从事公司治理、审计研究,联系方式happylele369@126.com。
作者简介:田高良,西安交通大学教授,博士,主要从事资本市场与公司治理、内部控制与风险管理研究;封华,西北工业大学副教授,博士,主要从事公司治理、审计研究;吴璇,哈尔滨工业大学助理教授,博士,主要从事资产定价、信息披露和资本市场研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“网络舆情对企业绩效与股票价格的影响机制及管理方法研究”（71672141); 国家自然科学基金面上项目“媒体报道发挥公司治理作用的机制研究：理论分析与实证检验”（71372163）; 深圳市人文社会科学重点研究基地成果

Joint Researches on Network and Corporate Innovation Investment: Based on the Empirical Evidences from Institutional Investors’ Field Researches

WANG Le^1,2, TIAN Gao-liang¹, FENG Hua³, WU Xuan⁴

1. Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049;
2. Xi’an Mingde Institute of Technology, Xi’an 710124;
3. Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an 710109;
4. Harbin Institute of Technology (Shenzhen), Shenzhen 518055, China

Received:2021-01-05 Revised:2021-02-10 Online:2021-03-15 Published:2021-03-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以2013—2018年深交所A股上市公司为研究对象,通过分析机构投资者联合调研网络的治理机制,检验了被调研公司的信息网络位置与创新投入之间的关系。研究发现：机构投资者联合调研网络中心度越高,其调研的公司创新投入越大,且上述关系在信息环境越差、代理成本高的公司中更为显著。进一步分析发现：机构投资者联合调研网络能够提高被调研公司的信息透明度、约束管理层的自利行为和缓解融资约束。

关键词: 机构投资者联合调研网络, 企业创新, 信息环境, 代理成本

Abstract: Taking the A-share companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2018 as the research objects, this paper analyzes the governance mechanism of the institutional investors’ joint research on network and examines the relationship between the information network location of the companies under research and the innovation investment. The findings of the study show that the higher the centrality of the institutional investors’ joint research on network, the greater the investment in innovation of the companies under investigation. And the above relationship is more significant in companies with worse information environment and higher agency costs. It is found through further analysis that the institutional investors’ joint research network can not only improve the information transparency of the companies under survey, but also restrain the self-interested behaviors of the management and ease the financing constraints.

Key words: institutional investors' joint research on network, corporate innovation, information environment, agency cost

中图分类号:

F275.1

王乐, 田高良, 封华, 吴璇. 联合调研网络与企业创新投入——基于机构投资者实地调研的经验证据[J]. 当代财经, 2021, 0(3): 88-99.

WANG Le, TIAN Gao-liang, FENG Hua, WU Xuan. Joint Researches on Network and Corporate Innovation Investment: Based on the Empirical Evidences from Institutional Investors’ Field Researches[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(3): 88-99.

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