Abstract: Agricultural brand building is an important means of promoting high-quality agricultural development and an important symbol of agricultural power. The participants in agricultural brand construction are complex, and a clear understanding of their behavioral choices during the construction process can enrich and innovate the theory and practice of Chinese style agricultural brand construction. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the strategic choices and implementation conditions of local governments, agricultural product producers, and consumers in the construction of agricultural brands, and conducts complex network simulation experiments. The results show that: (1) the tripartite game between local governments, producers, and consumers can evolve to a stable state of government incentives, producer participation, and consumer purchases, and the equilibrium and stability conditions of each entity are closely related to their own cost benefits, the producers’ brand value awareness and the brand stickiness can promote strategic stability; (2) as exogenous factors, local governments and consumers’ choicescan jointly promote the strategic learning of the production entities in the complex networks, in which the exogenous forces act on producer costs and benefits, thereby promoting the evolution and stability of production strategies; (3) driven by the market, the brand premium can promote the successful diffusion of agricultural brand production strategies. Therefore, the ultimate goal of China’s agricultural brand construction should be to become a strong agricultural country, driven by both the government and the market; it should cultivate a mutually beneficial and symbiotic mechanism among the participating entities.

Key words: agricultural power, agricultural brand building, evolutionary game, complex network