Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics ›› 2019, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (02): 147-.

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Research on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game Relationship of Pension PPP Service Quality Supervision

YUE Xiang-hua, LIN Yu-ming   

  1. (Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China)
  • Published:2021-01-21

Abstract: In order to explore how to establish an effective supervision mechanism so as to make the PPP service of the pension industry develop with high quality, this paper breaks the previous studies with single variable and attempts to introduce multiple variables such as public participation level, reputation, government subsidies and punishments to establish an evolutionary game model among the three sides of private sector, third party and government department. Through analyzing the factors affecting the strategy selection of each side and the evolution, this paper establishes the conditions for the behavior strategies of all parties tending to stabilize and simulates the “ideal state” in the game results by means of Matlab. The results show that under the constraints of such factors as reputation, government subsidies and punishments, when the level of public participation is high, the third party tends to perform evaluation duties and the private sector tends to improve the quality of service even if the government departments are negatively regulated; however, when the level of public participation is low, the evolution trend of the behavior of any party is closely related to the strategy choices of the other two parties. It will help to achieve the “ideal goal” of the high-quality development of PPP services in the pension industry if we can establish a reputation mechanism and a punishment mechanism, improve the current public participation mechanism and government subsidy mechanism, and combine the four to form a multi-dimensional supervision.

Key words: pension industry; PPP mode; quality supervision; evolutionary game; tripartite game