Abstract: To break through the traditional obstacle of eliminating personal just claim in the consumers’ civil public benefits litigation, it is necessary to compare the institutional justice and institutional efficiency of the group action with other alternative ways from the perspective of the new institutional economics. The private prosecutor initiating mode of group action combines the enthusiasm of the minority with the judicial supervision, which can really compensate the interests of the litigants directly to the consumers, so it is a more effective way approaching justice than other alternatives. The nature of group litigation is a kind of governing mechanism for the majority with uncertain number to eliminate the obstacles in their collective action so as to reach consolidated action; while the representative litigation system cannot consider the transaction cost of law enforcement from the human angle, which would increase the difficulty of litigation. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce group actions so as to improve the implementation mechanism of Chinese consumers’ public benefit litigation.

Key words: consumers’ civil public benefits litigation; social enforcement; class action; transaction costs