江西财经大学学报 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (3): 125-136.

• 法与经济 • 上一篇    

透明度与显名化:中国股权代持规制理念及制度革新研究

艾茜   

  1. 中央财经大学 法学院,北京 100081
  • 收稿日期:2024-02-04 出版日期:2024-05-25 发布日期:2024-06-13
  • 作者简介:艾茜,中央财经大学副教授,贵州财经大学商法研究中心执行主任,法学博士,主要从事民商法研究,联系方式aiqianrise@163.com。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金一般项目“执行法典化背景下的债务人异议之诉体系化研究”(23BFX138)

Transparency and Nominalization: On the Ideological and Institutional Reform of the Regulation of Shareholding Entrustment in China

AI Xi   

  1. Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China
  • Received:2024-02-04 Online:2024-05-25 Published:2024-06-13

摘要: 股权代持类型多样,有适法型代持,也有违法型代持。股权代持既能够活跃民间投融资,促进经济发展,也能成为洗钱和灰色利益交易的工具,给上市公司监管、股权纠纷司法审判工作带来很多的困扰。在股权代持规制方面,由于理念不清,引入大陆法系隐名合伙理念的同时,却没有完全采严格的商事外观主义理念。在上市公司股权代持规制方面,采全面禁止的规制理念,加之大陆法系的隐名合伙和严格的商事外观主义理念,本身在逻辑上就存在无法自洽的矛盾和冲突。同时,《合伙企业法》也未引入隐名合伙概念,各种规制理念相互矛盾,造成规制手段失灵,股权代持现象过多。英美法系通过增加股权透明度和显名化方面的规制理念,有着很好的启示。参考英美法系改革成果,可以及时按照FATF的要求改革《公司法》《证券法》,更新规制理念,增加股权透明度,迫使股权代持向显名化方向发展。可以引入重大利益持有人概念,建立相应的配套制度,引导股权代持行为向健康方向发展,在不误伤有效需求的同时,遏制各种违法股权代持行为。

关键词: 股权代持, 隐名合伙, 重大利益持有人, 商事外观主义

Abstract: There are various types of shareholding entrustment in China, including legal and illegal ones. On the one hand, shareholding entrustment can activate private investment and financing, promoting economic development, and on the other hand, it can also become a tool for money laundering and gray interest transactions, bringing many difficulties to the supervision of listed companies and the judicial trial of equity disputes. In terms of the current regulation of shareholding entrustment, due to unclear concepts, the concept of “Dormant Partnership”introduced in the civil law system did not fully adopt the strict concept of “Commercial Externalism”. In terms of the regulation of shareholding entrustment in listed corporations, the regulatory concept of “Complete Prohibition”has been adopted; plus the concept of “Dormant Partnership”in the Civil Law System and the strict “Commercial Externalism”, itself has contradictions and conflicts that cannot be reconciled logically. At the same time, China’s Partnership Enterprise Law has not introduced the concept of “Dormant Partnership”. Conflicts and contradictions in various regulatory concepts have led to the failure of regulatory measures, resulting in a proliferation of shareholding entrustment. The regulatory concepts of increasing equity transparency and nominalization in the Common law system have provided us with good insights. With reference to the reform achievements of the Common Law System, this article suggests to timely reform the Company Law and the Securities Law in accordance with the requirements of the FATF, update the regulatory concepts, increase equity transparency, and force shareholding entrustment to develop towards nominalization. It is also suggested to introduce the concept of “Substantial Interest Holder”, establish the corresponding supporting systems to guide the healthy development of shareholding entrustment behavior, and curb various illegal equity shareholding entrustment behaviors without harming the effective demands at the same time.

Key words: dormant shareholder, dormant Partnership, substantial interest holder, commercial externalism

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