江西财经大学学报 ›› 2024, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (6): 88-99.

• “三农”研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

创新激励与滞销预防:扶贫产品认定策略研究

胡蝶, 王容宽   

  1. 西南大学 经济管理学院, 重庆 400715
  • 收稿日期:2023-03-19 修回日期:2024-09-07 出版日期:2024-11-25 发布日期:2024-11-29
  • 通讯作者: 王容宽,西南大学讲师,管理学博士,主要从事技术经济、农业经济管理等研究,联系方式wangrkuan@foxmail.com。
  • 作者简介:胡蝶,西南大学讲师,管理学博士,主要从事农业经济管理研究。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究项目“农产品众筹中的劣势者效应研究”(19YJC630056);教育部人文社会科学研究项目“民营科技企业基础研究中的印记效应研究:表现、机理与干预”(20XJC630006)

Innovation Incentivizing and Slow Sale Preventing: A Study of the Identification Strategy of Poverty Alleviation Products

HU Die, WANG Rong-kuan   

  1. Southwest University, Chongqing 400715, China
  • Received:2023-03-19 Revised:2024-09-07 Online:2024-11-25 Published:2024-11-29

摘要: 做好扶贫产品认定工作是持久推动农产品出村进城乃至长效开展消费帮扶的关键。高认定标准要求扶贫企业承担较高强度的扶贫责任,尽管能倒逼有创新能力的企业积极提升产品质量,但也推高了扶贫产品的供给量,如果扶贫企业缺乏创新能力则容易诱发扶贫产品滞销。因而,扶贫产品认定标准的设定面临激励创新与预防滞销的两难。基于自主构建的扶贫产品认定标准设定模型,分析了四种常见策略及相应的优化策略,研究表明,第一,四种常见策略皆会给当地总收益造成损失,单一低标准无法激励创新,单一高标准则会带来滞销风险,高销量奖励和刚性限价会导致农产品售价过低;第二,选择性高销量奖励、选择性收益共享、选择性价格裁剪与选择性创新补贴四种优化策略均能激励高能力者选择高标准并创新,且能引导低能力者选择低标准从而消除滞销风险,最终实现当地总收益最大化。由于四种优化策略的实施要求、决策区间以及福利效应皆有差异,政策制定者需综合考虑当地创新能力、扶贫产品的需求价格弹性、农户收益和财政负担等因素。

关键词: 农产品滞销, 创新激励, 扶贫产品认定, 扶贫企业创新, 政策设计

Abstract: Doing a good job in identifying poverty alleviation products is the key to continuously promoting the export of agricultural products from villages to cities and even carrying out long-term consumption assistance. The high recognition standards require poverty alleviation enterprises to undertake a relatively higher level of poverty alleviation responsibility. Although it can force innovative enterprises to actively improve product quality, it also increases the supply of poverty alleviation products. If poverty alleviation enterprises lack innovation capabilities, it is easy to trigger the stagnation of poverty alleviation products. Therefore, the setting of criteria for identifying poverty alleviation products faces a dilemma of incentivizing innovation and preventing unsold products. Based on the independently constructed poverty alleviation product identification standard setting model, this paper analyzes the four common strategies and corresponding optimization strategies. The findings show that, firstly, all the four common strategies will cause losses to the local total revenue. A single low standard cannot stimulate innovation, and a single high standard will bring the risk of unsold products, while the high sales rewards and rigid price limits will lead to low selling prices of agricultural products. Secondly, the four optimized strategies of selective high sales rewards, selective revenue sharing, selective price cutting, and selective innovation subsidies can all motivate high performers to choose high standards and carry out innovation, and they can guide low performers to choose low standards to eliminate the risk of unsold products, ultimately achieving the maximization of local total revenue. Due to the differences in implementation requirements, decision-making intervals, and welfare effects among the four optimization strategies, the policy makers need to comprehensively consider such factors as the local innovation capabilities, the demand price elasticity of poverty alleviation products, farmers’ income, and fiscal burden.

Key words: slow sale of agricultural products, innovation incentivizing, identification of poverty-alleviating product, innovation of poverty-alleviating enterprises, policy design

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