养老服务老年用户反馈的有效性：一个演化博弈分析

江西财经大学学报 ›› 2022, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (4): 71-82.

养老服务老年用户反馈的有效性：一个演化博弈分析

岳向华¹, 林毓铭²

1.湘南学院经济与管理学院, 湖南郴州 422000;
2.暨南大学公共管理学院,广东广州 510632

收稿日期:2021-11-29 出版日期:2022-07-25 发布日期:2022-08-10
通讯作者: 岳向华,湘南学院副教授,管理学博士,主要从事项目管理和社会保障研究,联系方式460022688@qq.com
作者简介:林毓铭,暨南大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事社会保障与养老保险研究。
基金资助:
湖南省教育厅重点项目“湖南省农村人口养老模式与产业化问题研究”（21A0531）; 郴州市社会科学规划课题“用户参与下养老服务质量问题监管体系建设研究”（czssk12021041）

The Effectiveness of the Feedback from Elderly Users in Elderly Care Services: An Evolutionary Game Analysis

YUE Xiang-hua¹, LIN Yu-ming²

1. Xiangnan University, Chenzhou 422000;
2. Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China

Received:2021-11-29 Online:2022-07-25 Published:2022-08-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 养老服务质量关系着老年用户的健康和安全,成为我国急需解决的重要问题。为探索老年用户反馈对养老服务质量管控的有效性,本文以民营养老机构服务质量为研究对象,运用多群体演化博弈理论,基于老年用户反馈机制建立“民营养老机构-第三方评估机构-政府监管部门”三方博弈模型。通过模型推导和Matlab软件仿真分析了博弈三方最优均衡点的演化过程以及老年用户负面反馈的“感知价值”变化对博弈主体行为策略的影响。研究发现：老年用户负面反馈的“感知价值”是影响博弈三方“理想”策略实现的重要因素;民营养老机构和第三方评估机构对老年用户负面反馈的感知价值越大就会越顾忌声誉而自律。因此,政府建立和完善老年用户的反馈机制,不仅能约束民营养老机构和第三方评估机构寻租违规行为,而且有助于民营养老机构更好地了解老年用户的需求,从而提高养老服务质量。

关键词: 老年用户反馈, 感知价值, 养老服务, 三方演化博弈

Abstract: The quality of elderly care services is related to the health and safety of elderly users, which has become an important problem that needs to be solved urgently in China. In order to explore the effectiveness of feedback of the elderly users on the quality control of elderly care services, this paper takes the service quality of private elderly care institutions as the research objects, adopts the multi-group evolutionary game theory, and establishes a tripartite game model of “private elderly care institution-third-party evaluation agency-government supervision”on the basis of the feedback mechanism of the elderly users. Through the model derivation and the Matlab software simulation, it analyzes the evolution process of the optimal equilibrium point of the three parties in the game and the influence of the change of the “perceived value” of the negative feedback from the elderly users on the behavior strategy of the game subjects. The findings show that the “perceived value” of the negative feedback from the elderly users is an important factor affecting the realization of the “ideal”strategy of the three parties in the game; the greater the perceived value of the negative feedback from the elderly users by the private elderly care institutions and the third-party evaluation agencies, the more they will care for their reputation and the moreself-disciplinedthey will become. Therefore, to establish and improve the feedback mechanism for elderly users by the government can not only restrain private elderly care institutions and third-party evaluation agencies from rent-seeking violations, but also help private elderly care institutions to better understand the needs of elderly users, thereby improving the quality of the elderly care services.

Key words: the feedback of the elderly users, perceived value, elderly care service, tripartite evolutionary game

中图分类号:

D669.6

岳向华, 林毓铭. 养老服务老年用户反馈的有效性：一个演化博弈分析[J]. 江西财经大学学报, 2022, 0(4): 71-82.

YUE Xiang-hua, LIN Yu-ming. The Effectiveness of the Feedback from Elderly Users in Elderly Care Services: An Evolutionary Game Analysis[J]. Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2022, 0(4): 71-82.

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