投服中心与投资者保护：来自信息披露的证据

江西财经大学学报 ›› 2022, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (1): 32-46.

投服中心与投资者保护：来自信息披露的证据

熊家财, 童大铭

江西财经大学会计发展研究中心,江西南昌 330013

收稿日期:2021-01-13 修回日期:2021-03-16 出版日期:2022-01-25 发布日期:2022-02-22
通讯作者: 熊家财,江西财经大学教授,博士,主要从事公司财务研究,联系方式xiongjiacai@jxufe.edu.cn。
作者简介:童大铭,江西财经大学会计发展研究中心研究人员,主要从事公司财务研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金地区项目“地方经济增长目标约束、资源配置与企业资本投向研究”（72162019）; 江西省社科基金青年项目“地方经济增长目标约束、资源配置与企业资本投向研究”（21YJ30）

CSISC and Investor Protection: Evidences from Information Disclosure

XIONG Jia-cai, TONG Da-ming

Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

Received:2021-01-13 Revised:2021-03-16 Online:2022-01-25 Published:2022-02-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 加强投资者保护是支撑资本市场持续高质量发展的重要基础。2014年由证监会牵头设立的中证中小投资者服务中心（投服中心）是我国资本市场加强投资者保护的重大制度创新。使用2015年第一季度至2017年第一季度A股上市公司数据,通过双重差分模型实证检验投服中心持股对企业信息披露的影响。研究结果显示：投服中心持股有助于降低企业的应计盈余管理水平;在高管持股水平较低以及由非行业专长事务所审计的公司,投服中心的监督作用更为显著;进一步分析发现,投服中心持股也有助于抑制企业基于真实活动的盈余操控行为。上述结论表明,投服中心持股有助于提升上市公司信息披露质量、进而增强中小投资者保护水平。

关键词: 投服中心, 投资者保护, 信息披露, 盈余管理

Abstract: Strengthening investor protection is the important foundation for supporting sustainable and quality development of the capital market. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) led the establishment of the China Security Investor Services Center (CSISC) in 2014, which is a major institutional innovation to strengthen investor protection in China’s capital market. By making use of the data of A-share listed companies from the first quarter of 2015 to the first quarter of 2017 and employing a DID model, this paper empirically tests the impact of CSISC’s shareholding on corporate information disclosure. The research results show that the CSISC’s shareholding is helpful to lower the level of accrual-based earnings management of enterprises. In the companies with lower executive share holdings or the companies audited by firms without industry specializations, the supervisory role of CSISC is more remarkable. The findings of further analysis show that the shareholding of CSISC also helps to restrain the earnings manipulation behaviors of enterprises based on real activities. The above conclusion indicates that the shareholding of CSISC can help to improve the information disclosure quality of listed companies and further enhance the level of protection of the medium and small investors.

Key words: CSISC, investor protect, information disclosure, earnings management

中图分类号:

F830.91

熊家财, 童大铭. 投服中心与投资者保护：来自信息披露的证据[J]. 江西财经大学学报, 2022, 0(1): 32-46.

XIONG Jia-cai, TONG Da-ming. CSISC and Investor Protection: Evidences from Information Disclosure[J]. Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2022, 0(1): 32-46.

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