关键词: 城镇职工基本养老保险,缴费激励机制,缴费基数,缴费年限

Abstract: Currently, the payment for urban workers’ basic old-age insurance in China lacks of incentive mechanism. Based on the principle of “pay longer and get more” and “pay more and get more”, this paper designs four incentive schemes for the payment of old-age insurance respectively. It also makes use of the three indicators, the net transfer amount, the payback period and the cross substitution rate, to evaluate the incentive effect of each scheme. The results show that the four schemes have certain effects on stipulating the insured persons to extend the payment years: the smaller the payment base, the lower the tendency to extend the payment years; the greater the payment base, the greater the earnings, and the stronger the incentive effect. The incentive from the schemes to the flexible employment is higher than that to the enterprise employees. The insured persons have “adverse selection” behaviors on the payment years.

Key words: urban workers’ basic old-age insurance; incentive mechanism for payment; payment base; payment years