Abstract: Based on the data of listed companies on GEM from 2009 to 2016, this paper conducts a study on how China’s venture capital institutions affect the content of strategic information disclosed by the invest-receiving enterprises from the perspectives of whether the venture capital holds shares and whether the venture capital holds a seat at the management level. The findings show that share holding of venture capital can increase the content of strategic information disclosed by the enterprises, and this effect is more obvious when the venture capital institutions hold a seat on the board of directors or the board of supervisors. Further research shows that the dense content of strategic information disclosed by the enterprises with investments from venture capital institutions is not to hide their manipulations on earnings, which proves that the post-investment management mechanism of the venture capital institutions can play a positive role through information disclosure. This research conclusion can not only enrich the relevant literatures on influencing factors of strategic information, which is non-financial information, but also prove the influencing mechanism of venture capital on enterprise information disclosure from a new perspective.

Key words: venture capital; strategic information; corporate governance