Abstract: From the perspectives of local financing gap, income from land-transferring fee, and analysis of investment project benefits of local debt, this paper conducts an analyses of the debt paying ability of the local governments during the period of the “post-land finance”. The results indicate that due to the influence of the local officials’ promotion mechanism, the vulnerable position of central government in the tripartite game with the local governments and financial institutions, and the lagging behind of the related systems, the local governments are reluctant to pay their debts. During the “post-land finance” era, the trend is most likely that the debt risks of the local governments will be further passed on to the central finance. Therefore, we must strengthen the local financing ability and make up for the lack of related systems, so as to prevent the debt risks of local governments from transferring to the central finance during the “post-land finance” era.

Key words: land finance; local government debt; debt paying ability; financial risk; the central finance