Contemporary Finance & Economics ›› 2012, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (02): 1484-.

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A Study of the Causes of Large Amount Cash Holding of China’s Listed Companies: Financing Restraint Theory or Principal-Agent Theory

SONG Chang   

  1. (Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872)
  • Received:2012-03-19 Published:2021-01-21

Abstract: There are mainly two theories that explain the corporate behavior of large amount cash holding: the financing restraint theory and the principal-agent theory. This paper makes use of the sample data of China’s listed companies to conduct multi-angle examinations and empirical tests. It is found that the companies holding large amount of cashes have such characteristics as high profitability, sound development, less dividend payment, low managerial ownership and less agency cost, etc. Through the group test of financing restraint, it is found that the companies with higher financing restrains have a significant positive cash-cash flow sensitivity, and the financing restraints force the listed companies to have stronger cash accumulating tendency and preference. The empirical study indicates that compared with the principal-agent theory, the financing restraint theory is more appropriate to explain the large amount cash holding behaviors of China’s listed companies.

Key words: large amount cash holdings; financing restraint; principal-agent