连锁股东与高管薪酬契约有效性

当代财经 ›› 2021, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (11): 89-100.

连锁股东与高管薪酬契约有效性

李世刚

江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌 330013

收稿日期:2021-06-29 修回日期:2021-09-17 出版日期:2021-11-15 发布日期:2021-11-23
作者简介:李世刚,江西财经大学副教授,博士,在站博士后,主要从事资本市场会计与财务问题研究,联系方式shigangli001@163.com。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目“民营企业境外避税地投资与代理成本：作用机制与经济后果”（71962012）; 中国博士后面上项目“民营企业境外投资与代理成本”（2019M662266）; 江西省博士后日常经费项目“资本市场参与度与区域产业结构调整”（2019RC04）

Interlocking Shareholders and Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts

LI Shi-gang

Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

Received:2021-06-29 Revised:2021-09-17 Online:2021-11-15 Published:2021-11-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 高管薪酬契约是否有效关系到薪酬激励效果,不仅受到管理层“寻租”的影响,还受到大股东监督的影响。连锁股东因关注投资组合价值的最大化而产生治理协同与合谋两种效应,因此,连锁股东能否对高管薪酬契约有效性产生影响以及产生何种影响值得关注。本文以2004—2019年A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验连锁股东对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。结果表明,连锁股东通过改善公司信息环境,促进高管薪酬信息流动和提高监督力度,提升了高管薪酬契约有效性,发挥了治理协同效应。横截面分析结果显示,控股型和机构投资型连锁股东均能显著发挥治理作用,但非控股型和非机构投资型连锁股东在高管薪酬契约方面不具有显著影响。本研究为全面正确认识连锁股东作用提供了经验证据,为监管机构合理引导连锁股东发挥作用、促进控股型连锁股东和机构投资型连锁股东的发展提供了决策依据。

关键词: 连锁股东, 高管薪酬契约, 控股型连锁股东, 机构投资型连锁股东

Abstract: Whether the executive compensation contract is effective is related to the effect of compensation incentives, which is not only affected by the rent-seeking of the management, but also by the supervision of the major shareholders. The interlocking shareholders may have the two effects, i.e., the governance synergy effect and the collusion effect, due to their attention to the maximization of portfolio value. Therefore, it is noteworthy whether the interlocking shareholders have an impact on the validity of the executive compensation contract and what kind of impact will be produced. Taking the A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2019 as the research objects, this paper empirically tests the influence of the interlocking shareholders on the validity of the executive compensation contracts. The findings show that the interlocking shareholders can promote the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts by improving the company information environment, promoting the flow of executive compensation information and enhancing supervision strength, which means the governance synergy effect is given a full play. The results of the cross-sectional analysis show that the interlocking shareholders of both share controlling type and institutional investment type can play a significant role in the governance, but the interlocking shareholders of non-share controlling type or non-institutional investment type have no significant influence on executive compensation contracts. This study provides empirical evidences for the comprehensive and correct understanding of the function of interlocking shareholders and the decision basis for the regulatory authorities to rationally guide the interlocking shareholders to play their roles and to promote the development of the interlocking shareholders of both the share controlling type and the institutional investment type.

Key words: interlocking shareholders, executive compensation contract, controlling interlocking shareholders, interlocking shareholders of institutional investments

中图分类号:

F235

李世刚. 连锁股东与高管薪酬契约有效性[J]. 当代财经, 2021, 0(11): 89-100.

LI Shi-gang. Interlocking Shareholders and Effectiveness of Executive Compensation Contracts[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(11): 89-100.

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