财政补贴分配与企业环保投资——基于组织公正理论的视角

当代财经 ›› 2025, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (2): 41-56.

财政补贴分配与企业环保投资——基于组织公正理论的视角

王晗笛^1,2, 贾凡胜^1,2, 田彬彬³

1.中国海洋大学管理学院,山东青岛 266100;
2.中国企业营运资金管理研究中心,山东青岛 266100;
3.中南财经政法大学财政税务学院,湖北武汉 430073

收稿日期:2024-07-09 修回日期:2025-01-06 发布日期:2025-02-12
通讯作者: 田彬彬,中南财经政法大学教授,博士生导师,经济学博士,主要从事公共财政、发展经济学研究,联系方式tianbinux@163.com。
作者简介:王晗笛,中国海洋大学博士研究生,主要从事制度与公司治理、财务管理研究;贾凡胜,中国海洋大学教授,博士生导师,经济学博士,主要从事制度与公司金融、公司治理研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“中国税收优惠落地的逻辑机理与政策优化研究”（72473157）; 国家自然科学基金面上项目“非上市企业信息披露的资本市场溢出效应研究：理论、机制与后果”（72472144）; 山东省泰山学者青年专家计划项目“数字化变革推动中小企业高质量发展研究”（tsqn202306097）

Fiscal Subsidy Distribution and Corporate Environmental Investment: From the Perspective of Organizational Justice Theory

Wang Han-di^1,2, Jia Fan-sheng^1,2, Tian Bin-bin³

1. Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100;
2. China Business Working Capital Management Research Center, Qingdao 266100;
3. Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China

Received:2024-07-09 Revised:2025-01-06 Published:2025-02-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 公正合理的财政补贴分配对于完善财政法治建设和提升企业参与环境治理动力具有重要作用。利用2011—2021年我国沪深A股上市公司样本数据,从组织公正理论的视角实证分析财政补贴分配对企业环保投资的影响的研究结果表明,地方财政补贴集中度越高,辖区内企业环保投资水平越低;当财政补贴集中由符合程序公正或互动公正的补贴引起时,财政补贴集中对企业环保投资的负面影响消失,表明财政补贴分配会通过影响企业公正性感知而影响企业环保投资。进一步研究发现,财政补贴集中对企业环保投资的负面影响在企业所处行业为非重污染行业、所处地区环境规制较弱和公司治理较差时更大,表明财政补贴分配引起的公正性感知与正式制度呈替代关系。因此,未来我国应加强财政补贴分配的法治化管理,提升财政补贴分配过程的程序公正性;加大财政补贴分配信息的公开力度,提升财政补贴分配的互动公正性;设立专门社会监督和意见反馈平台,充分发挥社会监督优势。

关键词: 财政补贴分配, 财政补贴集中度, 企业环保投资, 组织公正理论, 环境治理

Abstract: A fair distribution of fiscal subsidies plays a significant role in promoting the rule of law in finance and motivating firms to participate in environmental governance. From the perspective of organizational justice theory, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of fiscal subsidy distribution on corporate environmental investment based on the sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2011 to 2021. The findings suggest that the higher the concentration of local fiscal subsidies, the lower the environmental investment expenditure of enterprises within the jurisdiction; when the concentration of fiscal subsidies is caused by the subsidies that comply with procedural fairness or interactive fairness, the negative impact of fiscal subsidy concentration on corporate environmental investment disappears, indicating that the allocation of fiscal subsidies will affect corporate environmental investment by affecting their perception of fairness. Further research reveals that the the negative impact of concentrated fiscal subsidies on corporate environmental investment is greater when the industry in which the enterprise operates is not heavily polluting, the environmental regulations in the region are weak, and the corporate governance is poor. This indicates that the perception of fairness caused by fiscal subsidy allocation is substitutable with formal systems. Therefore, in the future, China should strengthen the rule of law management of fiscal subsidy allocation and enhance the procedural fairness of the fiscal subsidy allocation process, intensify the disclosure of information on the allocation of fiscal subsidies and enhance the fairness and interaction of fiscal subsidy allocation, and establish a specialized social supervision and feedback platform, fully leveraging the advantages of social supervision.

Key words: government subsidy distribution, concentration of financial subsidies, corporate environmental investment, organizational justice theory, environmental governance

中图分类号:

F812.45

王晗笛, 贾凡胜, 田彬彬. 财政补贴分配与企业环保投资——基于组织公正理论的视角[J]. 当代财经, 2025, 0(2): 41-56.

Wang Han-di, Jia Fan-sheng, Tian Bin-bin. Fiscal Subsidy Distribution and Corporate Environmental Investment: From the Perspective of Organizational Justice Theory[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2025, 0(2): 41-56.

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