当代财经 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7): 69-81.

• 现代金融 • 上一篇    下一篇

审批制度改革与公司权益价值

傅文霁1, 桂荷发2, 王红建2   

  1. 1.中国人民大学 财政金融学院,北京100872;
    2.江西财经大学 金融学院,江西 南昌 330031
  • 收稿日期:2023-02-16 修回日期:2023-04-25 出版日期:2023-07-15 发布日期:2023-09-13
  • 通讯作者: 王红建,江西财经大学教授,主要从事中国制度改革的微观经济效应研究,联系方式whj.hust@163.com
  • 作者简介:傅文霁,中国人民大学博士研究生,主要从事公司金融研究;桂荷发,江西财经大学教授,博士生导师,经济学博士,主要从事公司金融、资本市场以及科技金融研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大项目“政府职能转变的制度红利研究”(18ZDA113); 国家自然科学青年基金项目“审批制度改革的微观经济效应:基于放权理论的实证研究”(71902078); 中国人民大学2022年度拔尖创新人才培育资助计划

Approval System Reform and Corporate Equity Value

FU Wen-ji1, GUI He-fa2, WANG Hong-jian2   

  1. 1. Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872;
    2. Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330031, China
  • Received:2023-02-16 Revised:2023-04-25 Online:2023-07-15 Published:2023-09-13

摘要: 基于中国沪深两市A股上市公司数据并将审批制度改革纳入实物期权分析框架的实证研究表明:第一,审批制度改革能强化企业资本逐利动机,即当面临好的投资机会时,审批制度改革能够促使企业及时扩大投资,执行增长期权;当面临较差投资机会时,审批制度改革能够促使企业及时缩减投资,执行清算期权。第二,审批制度改革能促进企业增长期权价值和清算期权价值的提升。拓展性检验表明,审批制度改革对企业资本逐利动机的强化作用在投资机会信息波动更大以及下游企业(即投资机会信息更分散)的样本中更显著。在作用路径上,第一,审批制度改革能够显著削减企业家与政府打交道等非生产性活动的时间,并增加企业家经营管理的时间。第二,审批制度改革能够显著减少企业投资的审批时间。第三,基于中国工业企业数据的实证检验表明,审批制度改革显著加剧了地区竞争程度。上述结论意味着,政府部门应继续深化审批制度改革,并高度重视信息在政府放权过程中所扮演的重要角色,从而持续助力企业实现高质量发展。

关键词: 资本逐利动机, 行政审批中心, 期权价值, 信息分散程度

Abstract: This paper conducts an empirical study based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China and incorporating the approval system reform into the real options analytical framework. The findings show that, firstly, the approval system reform can strengthen the motivation of corporate capital seeking profit, i.e., when faced with good investment opportunities, the approval system reform can induce firms to expand investment and execute growth options in a timely manner; when faced with poor investment opportunities, the approval system reform can induce firms to scale down investment and execute liquidation options in a timely manner; when faced with poor investment opportunities, the reform of the approval system can prompt firms to scale down their investments and execute liquidation options. Secondly, the reform of the approval system can promote the increase of corporate growth option value and liquidation option value. The extensibility tests show that the reinforcing effect of the approval system reform on firms’ capital-seeking-profitmotivation is more significant in the samples with more volatile investment opportunity information and downstream firms (i.e., the investment opportunity information is more dispersed). In terms of the path of action, firstly, the approval system reform can significantly reduce the time entrepreneurs spend on non-productive activities such as dealing with the government and increase the time entrepreneurs spend on business management; secondly, the approval system reform can significantly reduce the investment approval time of enterprises; thirdly, the empirical test based on the database of Chinese industrial enterprises shows that the approval system reform has significantly increased the degree of regional competition. The above findings imply that the government departments should continue to deepen the reform of the approval system and attach great importance to the important role played by information in the process of government decentralization, so as to continuously help enterprises achieve high-quality development.

Key words: motivation of capital pursuing profit, administrative licensing centers, option value, degree of information dispersion

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