董秘兼任对投资者互动信息质量的影响

当代财经 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (4): 93-105.

董秘兼任对投资者互动信息质量的影响

李晓菲, 徐建

天津财经大学商学院,天津 300222

收稿日期:2021-06-22 修回日期:2023-01-27 出版日期:2023-04-15 发布日期:2023-04-12
通讯作者: 徐建,天津财经大学讲师,博士,主要从事公司治理和绿色治理研究,联系方式xujian@tjufe.edu.cn。
作者简介:李晓菲,天津财经大学博士研究生,主要从事公司治理研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目“政府环境行为、政企关系与公司绿色治理：基于‘央地分权’的视角”（71902133）; 天津市哲学社会科学规划项目“区域绿色治理体系构建和治理能力提升研究”（TJGLQN18-003）

The Impact of Board Secretary Holding Other Position on the Quality of Investors Interactive Information

LI Xiao-fei, XU Jian

Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China

Received:2021-06-22 Revised:2023-01-27 Online:2023-04-15 Published:2023-04-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 采用大数据和文本分析的方法,以深交所“互动易”平台2011—2021年的问答数据为基础,针对董秘兼任对投资者互动信息质量影响的实证结果表明：与专职董秘相比,董秘兼任其他高管能够显著地提升投资者互动信息质量的全面性和具体性;在董秘持股和分析师关注度较高的样本中上述影响更为显著。进一步研究发现,董秘兼任通过提高投资者互动信息质量,降低了控股股东与中小股东之间的代理成本。上述结论揭示董秘兼任在一定程度上缓解了当前董秘“权责不对称”状况,为进一步分析投资者互动信息的影响因素提供新的思路。

关键词: 董秘兼任, 互动信息, 信息披露, 代理成本

Abstract: By adopting the method of big data and text analysis and taking the question-and-answer data onthe“Interactive Easy”platform of Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2021 as the basis, this paper empirical investigates the impact of board secretary holding other position on the quality of investors’ interactive information. The results show that compared with full-time board secretary, the board secretary holding other executive position can significantly improve the comprehensiveness and specificity of the quality of investors’ interactive information. This impact is more significant in the samples of board secretary holding shares or the analysts paying more attentions. Further research reveals that board secretary holding other position also reduces the agency costs between the controlling shareholders and the medium and small shareholders through improving the quality of investors’ interactive information. The above-mentioned conclusion reveals that board secretary holding other position caneasy the present situation of the asymmetry between power and responsibility to a certain extent. It can also provide new ideas for further analysis of the factors influencing investors’ interactive information.

Key words: board secretary holding other position, interactive information, information disclosure, agency cost

中图分类号:

F270

李晓菲, 徐建. 董秘兼任对投资者互动信息质量的影响[J]. 当代财经, 2023, 0(4): 93-105.

LI Xiao-fei, XU Jian. The Impact of Board Secretary Holding Other Position on the Quality of Investors Interactive Information[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2023, 0(4): 93-105.

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