“惩一”必定“儆百”吗?处罚公告的有利比较效应研究——来自舞弊决策的实验证据

当代财经 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (3): 82-93.

“惩一”必定“儆百”吗?处罚公告的有利比较效应研究——来自舞弊决策的实验证据

陈邑早¹, 王圣媛²

1.山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南 250014;
2.辽宁大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳 110036

收稿日期:2022-03-31 出版日期:2023-03-15 发布日期:2023-03-23
通讯作者: 王圣媛,辽宁大学博士研究生,主要从事规制经济学研究,联系方式841142518@qq.com。
作者简介:陈邑早,山东财经大学讲师,博士,主要从事行为财务研究。
基金资助:
教育部人文社会科学规划项目“高管薪酬激励偏差与职务舞弊行为研究：契约参照点视域”（20YJA630007）

Can“Punishing One”Necessarily“Warn One Hundred Others”? A Study on the Favorable Comparative Effect of Punishment Announcement: Experimental Evidences from Fraudulent Decision-Making

CHEN Yi-zao¹, WANG Sheng-yuan²

1. Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014;
2. Liaoning University, Shenyang 110036, China

Received:2022-03-31 Online:2023-03-15 Published:2023-03-23

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 有利比较是个体在进行不道德决策中一种常见的认知加工过程,其通过与更恶劣的行为进行比较来降低自身实施不道德行为的道德谴责感。那么,现实中是否存在可能诱发个体产生有利比较的信息来源呢?理论上,监管处罚公告中披露的涉案金额相当大,社会影响相当恶劣的舞弊案例可能成为这样的潜在信息来源。通过模拟现实中的年度业绩报告情景,设计一个舞弊决策的实验室实验考察处罚公告中的严重型案例信息对小额舞弊决策者舞弊行为的影响。实验结果支持有利比较效应假说,即相比未受严重型案例信息诱导的被试,受到严重型案例信息诱导的被试在实验决策中的业绩虚报程度更高,且这一影响主要存在于风险偏好程度较高的被试中。此外,受到严重型案例信息诱导的被试在舞弊后表现出的负性情绪水平更低。

关键词: 处罚公告, 严重型案例信息, 有利比较, 舞弊决策, 负性情绪

Abstract: Favorable comparison is a common cognitive process of individuals in making unethical decisions. It reduces their sense of moral condemnation from the unethical behaviors performed by themselves by comparing with worse behaviors. Then, is there any information source that may induce individuals to make favorable comparison in reality? In theory, the fraud cases involving large amounts and with very bad social impacts that disclosed in the regulatory punishment announcements may become such potential information sources. By simulating the actual annual performance report scenario, this paper studies the impact of the information of severe casesrevealed in the punishment announcements on the fraud behaviors of small-amount fraud decision-makers by designing a laboratory to experiment and investigate the fraud decision-makings. The experimental results support the hypothesis of favorable comparative effect, that is, compared with the subjects who are not induced by the information of severe cases, the subjects who are induced by the information of severe cases have a higher degree of performance misstatement in the experimental decision-making, and this effect mainly exists in the subjects with a higher degree of risk preference. In addition, the subjects who are induced by the information of serious cases show a much lower level of negative emotion after performing fraudulent behaviors.

Key words: punishment announcement, serious case information, favorable comparison, fraudulent decision-making, negative emotions

中图分类号:

F406.7

陈邑早, 王圣媛. “惩一”必定“儆百”吗?处罚公告的有利比较效应研究——来自舞弊决策的实验证据[J]. 当代财经, 2023, 0(3): 82-93.

CHEN Yi-zao, WANG Sheng-yuan. Can“Punishing One”Necessarily“Warn One Hundred Others”? A Study on the Favorable Comparative Effect of Punishment Announcement: Experimental Evidences from Fraudulent Decision-Making[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2023, 0(3): 82-93.

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