大数据税收征管能抑制企业违规行为吗——基于“金税三期”的准自然实验分析

当代财经 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (2): 43-54.

大数据税收征管能抑制企业违规行为吗——基于“金税三期”的准自然实验分析

纪亚方¹, 梁日新², 池亚楠³

1.郑州轻工业大学经济与管理学院,河南郑州 450002;
2.首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京 100070;
3.中国矿业大学管理学院,北京 102206

收稿日期:2022-01-25 修回日期:2022-12-30 出版日期:2023-02-15 发布日期:2023-02-14
通讯作者: 梁日新,首都经济贸易大学博士研究生,主要从事公司治理与审计研究,联系方式liang_rx@cueb.edu.cn。
作者简介:纪亚方,郑州轻工业大学讲师,管理学博士,主要从事公司财务与公司治理研究;池亚楠,中国矿业大学博士研究生,主要从事环境会计研究。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目“重大突发公共事件对企业持续经营能力冲击的评价与应对研究”（21BGL089）; 河南省哲学社会科学规划项目“大数据税收征管治理企业违规行为的长效机制与创新政策研究”（2022CJJ175）

Can Big Data Tax Collection and Management Curb Corporate Violations?A Quasi-Natural Experiment Analysis Based on the“Third Phase of the Golden Tax Project”

JI Ya-fang¹, LIANG Ri-xin², CHI Ya-nan³

1. Zhengzhou University of Light Industry, Zhengzhou 450002;
2. Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070;
3. China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing 102206, China

Received:2022-01-25 Revised:2022-12-30 Online:2023-02-15 Published:2023-02-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 企业违规行为是阻碍资本市场高质量发展的“绊脚石”,防范治理企业违规行为,对于营造良好的资本市场生态环境至关重要。大数据税收征管作为一种外部治理机制,其能否以及如何抑制企业违规行为是一个急需关注的问题。基于此,借助“金税三期”税务稽查系统改革作为准自然实验,以2009—2018年A股上市公司为样本,构建多期双重差分模型,考察了大数据税收征管对企业违规行为的影响。研究发现,大数据税收征管能显著抑制企业违规行为;大数据税收征管通过降低企业的代理成本、提高企业信息透明度,进而抑制企业违规行为;大数据税收征管对企业违规行为的抑制作用在法律制度环境较差地区、内部控制质量较低的企业中更为显著。因此,建议夯实大数据税收征管的数据基础,提高大数据税收征管的数据整合能力;完善企业内外部治理机制,提升大数据税收征管的精准治理作用;完善资本市场的信息披露机制和市场监管机制,提高企业违规行为成本。

关键词: 大数据, 税收征管, 企业违规行为, 金税三期

Abstract: Corporate violations are“stumbling blocks”hindering the high-quality development of the capital markets. It is of vital importance to prevent and govern the corporate violations for the creation of favorable capital market ecological environment. As an external governance mechanism, whether and how big data tax collection and management can inhibit corporate violations is an issue that needs urgent attention. Based on this, with the help of“Golden Tax Phase III”tax inspection system reform as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper takes the A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2018 as samples to construct a multi-period DID model and investigates the impact of big data tax collection and administration on corporate violations. The findings show that big data tax collection and management can significantly inhibit corporate violations. Big data tax collection and administration caninhibit the illegal behavior of enterprises through reducing the agency cost and improving the information transparency of enterprises. The inhibitory effect of big data tax collection and administration on corporate violations is more significant in the regions with poor legal system environment and in the enterprises with lower quality of internal control. Therefore, it is suggested to consolidate the data foundation of big data tax collection and management,improve the data integration ability of big data tax collection and administration, improve the internal and external governance mechanisms of enterprises, enhance the precise governance role of big data tax collection and administration, improve the information disclosure mechanism and the market supervision mechanism of the capital markets,and raise the costs of corporate violations.

Key words: big data, tax collection and management, corporate violations, the Third Phase of the Golden Tax Project

中图分类号:

F812.42

纪亚方, 梁日新, 池亚楠. 大数据税收征管能抑制企业违规行为吗——基于“金税三期”的准自然实验分析[J]. 当代财经, 2023, 0(2): 43-54.

JI Ya-fang, LIANG Ri-xin, CHI Ya-nan. Can Big Data Tax Collection and Management Curb Corporate Violations?A Quasi-Natural Experiment Analysis Based on the“Third Phase of the Golden Tax Project”[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2023, 0(2): 43-54.

参考文献

[1] 王宏伟. “互联网+”视角下的税收治理现代化[J]. 税务研究,2017,(3):22-25.
[2] 曾亚敏,张俊生. 税收征管能够发挥公司治理功用吗?[J]. 管理世界,2009,(3):143-151+158.
[3] Dyck A.,Zingales L.Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison[J]. Journal of Finance,2004,59(2):537-600.
[4] 孙雪娇,翟淑萍,于苏. 大数据税收征管如何影响企业盈余管理?——基于“金税三期”准自然实验的证据[J]. 会计研究,2021,(1):67-81.
[5] Hanlon M.,Hoopes J.L.,Shroff N. The Effect of Tax Authority Monitoring and Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality[J]. Journal of the American Taxation Association,2014,36(2):137-170.
[6] 童锦治,黄克珑,林迪珊. 税收征管、纳税遵从与企业经营效率——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 当代财经,2016,(3):24-32.
[7] 郑建明,孙诗璐. 税收征管与审计费用——来自“金税三期”的准自然实验证据[J]. 审计研究,2021,(4):43-52.
[8] 徐捍军. 大数据税收征管降低了股价崩盘风险吗?——基于“金税三期”的准自然实验[J]. 上海财经大学学报,2021,(2):93-107.
[9] Kim C.F., Zhang L. D. Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2015,33(1):1-36.
[10] Adner R.,Puranam P.,Zhu F.What Is Different about Digital Strategy? From Quantitative to Qualitative Change[J]. Strategy Science,2019,4(4):253-261.
[11] 陈冬梅,王俐珍,陈安霓. 数字化与战略管理理论——回顾、挑战与展望[J]. 管理世界,2020,(5):220-236+20.
[12] Brynjolfsson E.,Geva T.,Reichman S.Crowd-Squared:Amplifying the Predictive Power of Search Trend Data[J]. MIS Quarterly,2016,40(4):941-961.
[13] 李世辉,卿水娟,贺勇,杨丽. 审计收费、CEO风险偏好与企业违规[J]. 审计研究,2021,(3):84-95.
[14] 朱凯,潘舒芯,胡梦梦. 智能化监管与企业盈余管理选择——基于金税三期的自然实验[J]. 财经研究,2021,(10):140-155.
[15] 李艳,杨婉昕,陈斌开. 税收征管、税负水平与税负公平[J]. 中国工业经济,2020,(11):24-41.
[16] 权小锋,徐星美,许荣. 社会责任强制披露下管理层机会主义行为考察——基于A股上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理科学学报,2018,(12):95-110.
[17] 何熙琼,尹长萍. 企业战略差异度能否影响分析师盈余预测——基于中国证券市场的实证研究[J]. 南开管理评论,2018,(2):149-159.
[18] 王小鲁,樊纲,胡李鹏. 中国分省份市场化指数报告(2018)[M]. 北京:社会科学文献出版社,2019.
[19] DeBacker J.,Heim B. T.,Tran A., et al. Legal Enforcement and Corporate Behavior:An Analysis of Tax Aggressiveness after an Audit[J]. The Journal of Law and Economics,2015,58(2):291-324.
[20] 文武康,王玉涛. 内部控制、税收征管与企业税务风险[J]. 当代财经,2021,(8):41-52.