有限合伙协议架构与融资约束——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据

当代财经 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (11): 80-92.

有限合伙协议架构与融资约束——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据

刘雨薇, 马胜

成都大学商学院,四川成都 610106

收稿日期:2023-01-06 修回日期:2023-06-14 出版日期:2023-11-15 发布日期:2023-11-08
通讯作者: 马胜,成都大学教授,管理学博士,主要从事财务管理和公司治理研究,联系方式masheng@cdu.edu.cn。
作者简介:刘雨薇,成都大学副教授,管理学博士,主要从事财务管理和公司治理研究。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目“混合所有制改革对国有企业投融资行为影响研究”（22XGL014）; 天府文化研究院2023年天府文化研究与文创课题一般项目“成都建设世界文化名城资金管理现状与优化研究”（TYB202307）; 国家自然科学基金项目“中国投资者保护公益组织运行效果与机制研究——基于并购重组中投服中心行权视角”（72272123）

Limited Partnership Agreement Structure and Financing Constraint: Evidences from China’s Private Listed Companies

LIU Yu-wei, MA Sheng

Chengdu University, Chengdu 610106, China

Received:2023-01-06 Revised:2023-06-14 Online:2023-11-15 Published:2023-11-08

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 新经济环境催生新型股权结构,同时可能引发更严重的信息不对称和融资困境。基于2014—2021年中国A股民营上市公司的样本,考察融入公司制企业的有限合伙协议架构对企业融资约束的影响及其作用机制的结果显示,有限合伙协议架构缓解了民营企业面临的融资约束。内在传导机制的检验表明,有限合伙协议架构降低了公司经营风险、改善了公司业绩表现、提高了公司现金分红比例,从而缓解融资约束。进一步分析发现,在成长期和衰退期,因代理问题更严重、融资需求更强烈,有限合伙协议架构对融资约束的缓解作用更显著。在科创板上市的企业,盈利不确定性大、风险高、投资者面临的信息不对称程度高,有限合伙协议架构更能有效地缓解融资约束问题。此外,实际控制人兼任董事长或总经理、两权分离度越高,越能显著地提高有限合伙协议架构缓解融资约束的作用,印证了有限合伙协议架构能够缓解实际控制人掏空的代理问题。上述研究结果从微观视角扩展了对我国资本市场新型股权结构的认识,为进一步提高民营企业融资能力提供了新的思路。

关键词: 有限合伙协议架构, 融资约束, 股权结构, 实际控制人, 代理问题

Abstract: The new economic environment has given rise to new equity structures, which may also lead to more serious information asymmetry and financing difficulties. Based on the samples of private A-share listed companies in China from 2014 to 2021, this paper examines the impact of the limited partnership agreement architecture integrated into corporate enterprises on corporate financing constraintsand its mechanism. The results show that the limited partnership agreement architecture can alleviate the financing constraints faced by private enterprises. The test of the internal transmission mechanism indicates that the limited partnership agreement structure has reduced the company’s operational risk, improved the company’s performance, increased the company’s cash dividend ratio, and thus alleviated financing constraints. Further analysis reveals that during the growth and decline periods, due to more severe agency issues and stronger financing needs, the limited partnership agreement structure has a more significant mitigating effect on financing constraints. The enterprises listed on the Science and Technology Innovation Board have high profitability uncertainty, high risks, and high degree of information asymmetry faced by investors. The limited partnership agreement structure can more effectively alleviate the financing constraints. In addition, if the actual controller concurrently serves as the chairman of the board or general manager, then the higher the degree of separation between the two powers, the more significant the role of the limited partnership agreement structure in alleviating financing constraints, which confirms that the limited partnership agreement structure can alleviate the agency problem of hollowing out by the actual controller.The above research results have expanded our understanding of the new equity structure in China’s capital market from a micro perspective, providing new ideas for further improvement of the financing capacity of private enterprises.

Key words: limited partnership agreement structure, financing constraints, equity structure, actual controller, agency issue

中图分类号:

刘雨薇, 马胜. 有限合伙协议架构与融资约束——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J]. 当代财经, 2023, 0(11): 80-92.

LIU Yu-wei, MA Sheng. Limited Partnership Agreement Structure and Financing Constraint: Evidences from China’s Private Listed Companies[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2023, 0(11): 80-92.

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