当代财经 ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (11): 54-66.

• 现代金融 • 上一篇    下一篇

股权质押的价值辩护:基于商誉的视角

赵宜一1, 郑登津2, 宋子威3   

  1. 1.对外经济贸易大学 国际商学院,北京 100029;
    2.中央财经大学 会计学院/中国管理会计研究与发展中心,北京 100081;
    3.清华大学 经济管理学院,北京 100084
  • 收稿日期:2023-03-14 修回日期:2023-09-18 出版日期:2023-11-15 发布日期:2023-11-08
  • 通讯作者: 郑登津,中央财经大学副教授,博士生导师,博士,主要从事公司财务与公司治理研究,联系方式zhengdengjincufe@126.com。
  • 作者简介:赵宜一,对外经济贸易大学副教授,博士,主要从事民营企业公司治理研究;宋子威,清华大学博士研究生,主要从事会计与资本市场研究。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金重点项目“我国小城镇的转型发展与治理研究”(71834005); 国家自然科学基金青年项目“党组织嵌入与民营上市公司的治理决策:需求、渠道与后果”(71802206); 北京市自然科学基金面上项目“京津冀一体化与企业高质量发展:经济和环境协同发展的视角”(9232020); 上海市哲学社会科学规划一般项目“世界级大城市缓解通勤的政策组合及对上海的借鉴研究——基于长三角一体化的背景”(2018BJB008); 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金

Value Justification for Equity Pledge: From the Perspective of Business Reputation

ZHAO Yi-yi1, ZHENG Deng-jin2, SONG Zi-wei3   

  1. 1. University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029;
    2. Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081;
    3. Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
  • Received:2023-03-14 Revised:2023-09-18 Online:2023-11-15 Published:2023-11-08

摘要: 借鉴“薪酬辩护”理论,控股股东在进行股权质押时有动机进行“价值辩护”,即为取得高融资额而向质权人证明质押股份的潜在高价值。溢价并购是提升市值的一个有效途径,并购商誉的计量属性代表着被并购资产未来的预期价值,那么,控股股东是否以此为股权质押提供辩护?研究发现,控股股东在公司存在商誉时更可能进行股权质押,商誉是股权质押的一个辩护理由。特别是,在信息环境更差、控股股东权力更大和并购动因为掏空的公司中,控股股东借助商誉进行股权质押的行为更加普遍,且商誉在后续更容易出现减值,说明控股股东是将商誉作为股权质押的伪辩护而非正当辩护。基于价值辩护的内部需求、外部环境和质押资金流向的检验也一致证明了上述伪辩护行为。此外,相对于银行质权人,券商质权人对上述伪辩护行为的风险防范程度更低。上述结论说明,“高商誉”和“高质押”的“双高”风险与控股股东的套利行为和现行的商誉准则、股权质押监管规定不完备有关。因此,在规范并购商誉确认原则的同时,强化股权质押行为的事前监管显得尤为重要。

关键词: 股权质押, 价值辩护, 商誉

Abstract: Referring to the hypothesis of“compensation justifying”, this paper believes that the controlling shareholders have the motive to conduct“value justifying”when they are trying to make equity pledge, i.e., in order to obtain higher financing, the controlling shareholder is motivated to assure the pledgee of the promising value of the pledged shares. The premium M&A is an effective way to increase market value, the measurement attribute of M&A goodwill represents the expected future value of the acquired assets. Does the controlling shareholder take advantage of the goodwill asset as a defense for equity pledge? The findings show that controlling shareholders are more likely to pledge their equity when the firm has good business reputation, business reputationis a justification for equity pledge. Especially in companies with poorer information environments, more powerful controlling shareholders and experiencing M&A of tunneling motivation, it is more common for controlling shareholders to use goodwill for equity pledge, and goodwill is more likely to be impaired in the future, indicating that controlling shareholders use goodwill as a false defense rather than a legitimate defense for equity pledge. The tests of internal demand, external environment, and pledged fund flow based on value defense also unanimously prove the above-mentioned pseudo defense behavior. In addition, compared to the bank pledgee, the securities firm pledgee has a lower level of risk prevention against the above-mentioned false defense behavior. The above conclusion indicates that the“double high”risks of“high goodwill”and“high pledge”are related to the arbitrage behavior of controlling shareholders, as well as the currentincomplete goodwill standards and equity pledge regulatory regulations. Therefore, while standardizing the principle of goodwillconfirming in mergers and acquisitions, it is particularly important to strengthen the prior supervision of equity pledge behaviors.

Key words: equitypledge, value justification, business reputation

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