财政纵向失衡会抑制区域创新效率的提升吗

当代财经 ›› 2022, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7): 27-37.

财政纵向失衡会抑制区域创新效率的提升吗

刘亮亮¹, 贺俊²

1.南京财经大学财政与税务学院,江苏南京 210023;
2.中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥 230026

收稿日期:2021-08-10 修回日期:2022-06-16 出版日期:2022-07-15 发布日期:2022-09-09
通讯作者: 刘亮亮,南京财经大学讲师,管理学博士,主要从事财政理论与政策研究,联系方式liangliu@nufe.edu.cn。
作者简介:贺俊,中国科学技术大学副教授,管理学博士,主要从事宏观经济政策研究。
基金资助:
江苏省自然科学基金青年项目“财政分权下基本公共服务供给技术效率及配置效率研究”（BK20190792）

Will Vertical Fiscal Imbalance Inhibit the Improvement of Regional Innovation Efficiency

LIU Liang-liang¹, HE Jun²

1. Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210023;
2. University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Received:2021-08-10 Revised:2022-06-16 Online:2022-07-15 Published:2022-09-09

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 深化财政体制改革是助推经济高质量发展的重要着力点,而提升区域创新效率是推动经济高质量发展的强劲动力。为此,在新时代经济高质量发展背景下,从财政纵向失衡这一全新视域探究区域创新效率问题。基于1998—2018年我国省级面板数据,实证分析财政纵向失衡对区域创新效率的影响及其作用机制。结果表明：财政纵向失衡显著抑制区域创新效率的提升,即给区域创新效率带来了损失。机制分析结果表明：地方政府之间的“为增长而竞争”强化了财政纵向失衡对区域创新效率的负向影响,而“为创新而竞争”弱化了财政纵向失衡对区域创新效率的负向影响。因此,需要改善地方政府财权与事权的不匹配程度、规范地方政府间竞争行为、完善地方官员的政治考核体系等措施,以适度缩小财政纵向失衡程度,引导地方政府由“为增长而竞争”向“为创新而竞争”转变,促进区域创新效率的提升。

关键词: 财政纵向失衡, 地方政府竞争, 区域创新效率, 政府间财政关系

Abstract: Deepening the reform of the financial system is an important focus to promote the high-quality economic development, and improving regional innovation efficiency is a strong driving force to promote the high-quality economic development. Therefore, under the background of high-quality economic development in the new era, this paper explores the issue of regional innovation efficiency from the new perspective of vertical fiscal imbalance. Based on China's provincial panel data from 1998 to 2018, this paper empirically analyzes the impact of vertical fiscal imbalance on the regional innovation efficiency and its mechanism. The results show that the vertical fiscal imbalance can significantly inhibit the improvement of regional innovation efficiency, which leads to the loss of regional innovation efficiency. The results of mechanism analysis show that“competition for growth”between local governments has strengthened the negative impact of vertical fiscal imbalance on regional innovation efficiency, while“competition for innovation”has weakened the negative impact of vertical fiscal imbalance on regional innovation efficiency. Therefore, it is necessary to correct the mismatch between the fiscal power and the administrative power of local governments, standardize the competition behaviors among local governments, improve the political assessment system of local officials and other measures, so as to appropriately reduce the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, guide local governments to change from“competition for growth”to“competition for innovation”, and promote the improvement of regional innovation efficiency.

Key words: vertical fiscal imbalance, local government competition, regional innovation efficiency, intergovernmental fiscal relations

中图分类号:

F812.4

刘亮亮, 贺俊. 财政纵向失衡会抑制区域创新效率的提升吗[J]. 当代财经, 2022, 0(7): 27-37.

LIU Liang-liang, HE Jun. Will Vertical Fiscal Imbalance Inhibit the Improvement of Regional Innovation Efficiency[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2022, 0(7): 27-37.

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