关键词: 风险投资, 实体企业, 金融化, 融资约束, 代理成本

Abstract: By making use of the data of China’s A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2020, this paper employs the panel regression model to empirically study the impact of venture capital holdings on the post-listing financialization of real enterprises and its mechanism. The findings show that venture capital holdings can significantly inhibit the post-listing financialization behavior of entity enterprises, among which the non-state-owned, or jointly invested, or highly reputed venture capital holdings have a stronger inhibitory effect on the post-listing financialization of entity enterprises. The results of the mechanism test based on the intermediary effect confirm that venture capital holdings can inhibit the financialization of real enterprises after listing mainly through the dual mechanism of alleviating the financing constraints of real enterprises and reducing agency costs. By employing the Heckman two-stage method and the PSM method to deal with potential endogeneity problems, the results of the empirical test are still robust. Therefore, it is suggested that the regulatory authorities should further optimize the relevant policies and regulations, and give full play to the venture capital in restraining entity enterprises from financialization.

Key words: venture capital, entity enterprises, financialization, financing constraints, agency cost