财政失衡下如何实现经济高质量发展——基于中央激励下地方政府行为分析

当代财经 ›› 2021, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7): 24-37.

财政失衡下如何实现经济高质量发展——基于中央激励下地方政府行为分析

王欣亮^a, 刘飞^a,b

西北大学 a.公共管理学院 b.哲学学院,陕西西安 710127

收稿日期:2021-03-16 修回日期:2021-06-03 出版日期:2021-07-15 发布日期:2021-07-26
通讯作者: 刘飞,西北大学讲师,博士,西北大学公共管理学院博士后,主要从事地方政府行为及创新发展研究,联系方式liufei@nwu.edu.cn。
作者简介:王欣亮,西北大学副教授,博士,主要从事财政理论与政策研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目“我国经济发展质量损失研究：基于财政失衡下地方政府行为偏向的分析”（72074180）; 国家自然科学基金青年项目“地方政府竞争引致创新要素错配及效率损失研究”（71904156）; 陕西省软科学研究计划一般项目“优化生产要素配置驱动陕西现代化产业体系构建路径研究”（2021KRM069）

How to Achieve High-Quality Economic Development under Fiscal Imbalance: An Analysis of Local Government Behaviors Motivated by the Central Government

WANG Xin-liang, LIU Fei

Northwest University, Xi'an 710127, China

Received:2021-03-16 Revised:2021-06-03 Online:2021-07-15 Published:2021-07-26

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 构建动态面板模型,利用SYS-GMM估计得出：财政纵向失衡与经济发展质量间呈倒“U”型关系,且地方政府投资与规制行为偏向是过度财政纵向失衡引致发展质量损失的原因;在适度财政纵向失衡下,中央财政激励与政治激励对经济高质量发展具有相似的边际影响,但过度时,政治激励对经济发展质量损失的抑制作用将强于财政激励;财政横向失衡会约束纵向失衡与经济发展质量间的关系,致使高度横向失衡地区纵向失衡适度阈值缩小,低度横向失衡地区适度阈值扩大。在横向失衡差异下,中央财政激励与政治激励积极作用存在区域异质性：高度横向失衡地区,单一政治激励或政治激励搭配转移支付作用更强;低度横向失衡地区,单一财政激励中税收分权优于政治激励或其他策略。因此,建议采取加大地方财力支持、实施差异化财税政策、优化晋升激励指标等措施,因地制宜降低财政失衡程度,扭转地方政府行为偏向,推进经济高质量发展。

关键词: 财政失衡, 地方政府行为, 财政激励, 高质量发展, 政治激励

Abstract: This paper constructs a dynamic panel model and uses the SYS-GMM estimation method for this study. The findings show that there is an inverted“U-shaped”relationship between financial vertical imbalance and economic development quality, and that the local government investments and regulation behavior bias are the reasons for the loss of development quality caused by excessive vertical fiscal imbalance. Under the vertical imbalance of moderate finance, the central finance and political incentives have a similar marginal effect on the high-quality economic development; however, if the vertical imbalance is excessive, the inhibitory effect of political incentives on the loss of economic development quality will be stronger than that of financial incentives. The horizontal fiscal imbalance will constrain the relationship between vertical imbalance and the quality of economic development, resulting in the shrinking of the moderate threshold value of vertical imbalance in areas with higher horizontal imbalance, and the enlarging of the moderate threshold value in areas with lower horizontal imbalance. With the differences of horizontal imbalances, there is regional heterogeneity in the active function between central finance and political incentives. In areas with higher horizontal imbalance, single political incentives or political incentives combined with transfer payments can play a stronger role, while in areas with lower horizontal imbalance, the tax decentralization in the single financial incentives is better than political incentives or other strategies. Therefore, it is suggested that such measures as increasing local financial support, implementing differentiated fiscal and taxation policies, optimizing the promotion incentive indexes and so on should be adopted, so as to reduce the degree of fiscal imbalances in accordance with local conditions, reverse the behavior bias of local governments, and promote the high-quality economic development.

Key words: fiscal imbalance, local government behavior, fiscal incentives, high-quality development, political incentives

中图分类号:

F812.4

王欣亮, 刘飞. 财政失衡下如何实现经济高质量发展——基于中央激励下地方政府行为分析[J]. 当代财经, 2021, 0(7): 24-37.

WANG Xin-liang, LIU Fei. How to Achieve High-Quality Economic Development under Fiscal Imbalance: An Analysis of Local Government Behaviors Motivated by the Central Government[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(7): 24-37.

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