金字塔层级、政府放权与国有企业代理成本

当代财经 ›› 2017, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (08): 239-.

金字塔层级、政府放权与国有企业代理成本

何勤英1，

（1. 华南农业大学经济管理学院，广东广州 510642；2. 西南政法大学经济学院，重庆 401120；3. 山西财经大学经济学院，山西太原 030006）

收稿日期:2017-03-31 发布日期:2021-01-21
作者简介:何勤英，华南农业大学教授，博士，主要从事劳动经济学、公司金融学研究；于文超，西南政法大学副教授，博士，主要从事发展经济学研究，通讯作者联系方式yuwenchao2000@163.com；秦晓丽，山西财经大学副教授，博士，主要从事宏观经济学研究。

Pyramid Hierarchy, Government Decentralization and Agency Costs of State-Owned Enterprises

HE Qin-ying1,

(1. South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou 510642; 2. Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120; 3. Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China)

Received:2017-03-31 Published:2021-01-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 金字塔股权结构是国有企业放权改革的有效途径之一。以2007—2014年中国国有上市公司为研究对象，基于政府放权的视角，实证考察金字塔股权结构对国有企业代理成本的影响。研究发现，随着国有上市公司所处的金字塔层级的增加，其超额代理成本将显著降低，而且这一效应随着城市层面政府干预水平的降低而增强。深入研究表明，超额代理成本对企业绩效具有显著的负向影响，但金字塔层级的减少会弱化这种负向影响。上述结论不仅为理解国有企业金字塔结构的经济后果提供了新的证据，更为提升国有企业的治理效率提供了政策借鉴。

关键词: 金字塔股权结构,政府放权,超额代理成本,国有企业改革

Abstract: The pyramid ownership structure is one of the effective ways to the decentralization reform of the state-owned enterprises. From the perspective of government decentralization, this paper takes China’s state-owned listed companies in the period of 2007-2014 as the research objects to empirically study the impact of the pyramid ownership structure on the agency cost of state-owned enterprises. The findings show that with the up moving in the pyramid hierarchy of the state-owned listed company, its excess agent costs will be significantly reduced, and this effect will increase with the decrease of the intervention of the municipal government. Further study shows that excess agency costs have a significant negative impact on corporate performance, but reducing the pyramid hierarchy may weaken this negative impact. The above conclusions not only provide new evidences for understanding the economic consequences of the pyramid structure of state-owned enterprises, but also provide a policy reference for improving the governing efficiency of state-owned enterprises.

Key words: pyramid ownership structure; government decentralization; excess agency costs; reform of state-owned enterprises

何勤英1，. 金字塔层级、政府放权与国有企业代理成本[J]. 当代财经, 2017, 0(08): 239-.

HE Qin-ying1,. Pyramid Hierarchy, Government Decentralization and Agency Costs of State-Owned Enterprises[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2017, 0(08): 239-.