当代财经 ›› 2015, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (03): 588-.

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投资者情绪与公司投资效率——基于薪酬激励与债务融资治理效应的实证研究

靳光辉1,刘志远2,黄宏斌3   

  1. (1. 兰州大学 管理学院,甘肃 兰州 730000;2. 南开大学 商学院,天津 300071;3. 天津财经大学 商学院,天津 300222)
  • 收稿日期:2014-10-11 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:靳光辉,兰州大学讲师,博士,主要从事资本市场财务与会计问题研究,联系方式jingh@lzu.edu.cn;刘志远,南开大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事资本市场财务与会计问题研究;黄宏斌,天津财经大学讲师,博士,主要从事资本市场财务与会计问题研究。

Investor Sentiment and Corporate Investment Efficiency: An Empirical Study Based on the Governance Effects of Compensation Incentive and Debt Financing

JIN Guang-hui1, LIU Zhi-yuan2, HUANG Hong-bin3   

  1. (1. Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000; 2. Nankai University, Tianjin 300071; 3. Tianjin University of Finance and Economics, Tianjin 300222, China)
  • Received:2014-10-11 Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 将投资者情绪与传统理性视角下公司治理机制相结合,检验管理层薪酬激励和债务融资两种治理机制与投资者情绪交互作用对投资非效率的治理效应。研究发现,考虑投资者非理性影响,管理层薪酬激励、债务融资均与投资不足显著负相关;其与投资者情绪的交乘项均与过度投资显著正相关。研究结果表明两种治理机制对投资不足具有显著的抑制作用,而对过度投资的治理效应却依赖于投资者情绪状态。

关键词: 投资者情绪,投资效率,薪酬激励,债务融资

Abstract: By combining investor sentiment with corporate governance mechanisms from the traditional rational perspective, this paper examines the interactive effect of the two kinds of governance mechanisms (the management compensation incentive and debt financing) and investor sentiment on the governance effect of investment inefficiency. The results indicate that, considering the effect of investors’ non-rationality, management compensation incentive and debt financing both have significantly negative correlation with under-investment, and the interaction effect with investor sentiment both have significantly positive correlation with over-investment. The results show that the two kinds of governance mechanisms have significant inhibiting effect on under-investment, while their effects of governance on over-investment depend on the emotional state of investors.

Key words: investor sentiment; investment efficiency; compensation incentive; debt financing