当代财经 ›› 2012, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (04): 1504-.

• • 上一篇    

论劳资谈判中的信息披露问题

任小平   

  1. (中国劳动关系学院,北京 100048)
  • 收稿日期:2012-05-28 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:任小平,中国劳动关系学院副教授,主要从事企业管理、财务分析、劳动关系和集体谈判研究。

On Information Disclosure in Collective Negotiations

REN Xiao-ping   

  1. (China Institute of Industrial Relations, Beijing 100048, China)
  • Received:2012-05-28 Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 信息披露对提升劳资谈判质量至关重要。就个案资讯来看,在我国的劳资关系领域,技术层面的信息披露机制缺失,使本来就缺乏集体行动权的工人在劳资谈判中的弱势地位进一步恶化,包括“偶发性”在内的劳资冲突将可能显得更加无序。研究的结果表明,基于劳资关系调整、产业关系稳定、劳动关系和谐乃至社会和谐的现实考量,有必要强化资方在劳资谈判中的信息披露义务,以最大限度消解工人因谈判信息不对等而导致的误会和误解,在抑制劳资冲突的同时,让劳资双方在市场规则允许的条件下充分博弈,为劳资自治创造积极条件。

关键词: 劳资谈判,工人权益,信息披露,责任归置

Abstract: Information disclosure is of critical importance in enhancing the quality of collective negotiations. As for the information in individual cases, there is no information disclosure mechanism at the technical level in China’s labor-capital relationship, which further deteriorate the weak position of the workers in the collective bargaining who are already short of the right to collective action; the labor conflicts, including the “sporadic”, may appear more disordered. The research results show that, considering the reality of the labor-capital relationship adjustment, industrial relation stability, labor relation harmony, and social harmony, it is necessary to strengthen the information disclosure obligations of the employers in the collective negotiations, so as to minimize workers’ misunderstandings and misconceptions caused by asymmetric information in negotiations. When restraining labor conflicts, both employers and employees can have a fair play under the conditions allowed by the market rules, so as to create favorable conditions for the labor-capital autonomy.

Key words: collective negotiation; workers’ rights; information disclosure; responsibility defining