当代财经 ›› 2012, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (02): 1484-.

• • 上一篇    

中国上市公司高额现金持有行为溯因:融资约束理论抑或委托代理理论

宋常   

  1. (中国人民大学 商学院,北京 100872)
  • 收稿日期:2012-03-19 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:宋 常,中国人民大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事财务理论与金融市场、审计理论与价值管理研究;

A Study of the Causes of Large Amount Cash Holding of China’s Listed Companies: Financing Restraint Theory or Principal-Agent Theory

SONG Chang   

  1. (Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872)
  • Received:2012-03-19 Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 对于公司高额现金持有行为的理论解释主要有委托代理理论和融资约束理论,文章利用中国上市公司样本数据进行多角度考察与实证检验,发现高额现金持有公司具有盈利能力强、成长性好、股利支付少、高管持股低、代理成本小等诸多公司特征;通过融资约束分组检验发现,高融资约束公司的“现金—现金流敏感性”显著为正,融资约束使得上市公司具有较强的现金积累倾向与偏好。实证研究表明:与委托代理理论相比,融资约束理论更适用于解释中国上市公司的高额现金持有行为。

关键词: 高额现金持有,融资约束,委托代理

Abstract: There are mainly two theories that explain the corporate behavior of large amount cash holding: the financing restraint theory and the principal-agent theory. This paper makes use of the sample data of China’s listed companies to conduct multi-angle examinations and empirical tests. It is found that the companies holding large amount of cashes have such characteristics as high profitability, sound development, less dividend payment, low managerial ownership and less agency cost, etc. Through the group test of financing restraint, it is found that the companies with higher financing restrains have a significant positive cash-cash flow sensitivity, and the financing restraints force the listed companies to have stronger cash accumulating tendency and preference. The empirical study indicates that compared with the principal-agent theory, the financing restraint theory is more appropriate to explain the large amount cash holding behaviors of China’s listed companies.

Key words: large amount cash holdings; financing restraint; principal-agent