Abstract: The behavior of refusal to deal by Internet enterprises usually has obvious rationalities, such as saving transaction cost, promoting market entry, improving operating efficiency, and so on. However, the efficiency rationalities, such as preventing free-riding and maintaining product quality, can be hardly found. China’s existing laws and regulations concerning anti-monopoly have such deficiencies as unclear standards, poor operability, and so on. The basic principle of“modest restraining”should be followed in the antitrust regulation on the behavior of refusal to deal by internet enterprises. It is proposed to regard the“market foreclosure effect”as the most important factor to measure the anti-competition effects of the behavior of refusal to deal by Internet enterprises, and add other effects as supplementary investigation factors. Close attention should be paid to the acts of refusal to enter the essential facilities by the Internet enterprises. It is also suggested to introduce the standard of “safe harbor”; when abuse behaviors are being identified, the primary investigation should be applied to the anti-competition effects of the acts rather than the ante-competition intents.

Key words: internet; refusal to deal; anti-monopoly; essential facilities