Abstract: The widespread phenomenon of exclusive data licensing in the development of new business models has become a key issue that restricts the value realization of data elements and hinders high-quality industrial development. The core participants in business models, exemplified by smart connected vehicles, exclude downstream market competition through exclusive data licensing, leading to distorted data element allocation, damage to the industrial innovation ecosystem, and reduced consumer welfare. The current antitrust regulation not only fulfills the traditional duty of maintaining market order but also bears the mission of unleashing the value of data elements amid the absence of data ownership confirmation. Consequently, it triggers challenges in antitrust regulation, such as constraints and conflicts between traditional contract principles and fundamental rights protection perspectives with the principle of key facilities, difficulties in determining the market dominance of core business model participants, and insufficient oversight on data disclosure. To address these challenges, it is necessary to shift from the concept of contractual freedom to contractual fairness and from absolute protection of fundamental rights to relative protection at the ideological level, providing a new theoretical foundation for antitrust regulation in the digital economy. Additionally, the introduction of a “prohibition on abuse of relative advantageous position” mechanism into antitrust law is required, alongside the establishment of a “dual regulation” model that integrates antitrust enforcement with industry supervision, so as to improve the toolkit for antitrust regulation in the digital economy.

Key words: new business models, exclusive data authorization, antitrust regulation, relative dominance, intelligent connected vehicles