Abstract: Platform operators have the power to formulate rules, control access, and allocate resources in the platform markets. Driven by the self-interest of platform companies, this power is easy to be abused, thereby damaging the interests of other entities. Platform power is essentially a re-expression of market power, and anti-monopoly law regulations with the “gene” of limiting power should be applied on it, without resorting to other public law theories or establishing a new legal system. Anti-monopoly regulations have often been ignored and underestimated as a tool to limit platform power, mainly due to the rigidity and lagging behind of traditional regulatory frameworks, which ignores the diversification of platform market power sources and abuses the platform power resulting in the damage to the particularity of diversification and dynamism. Therefore, it is necessary to innovate the identification method of market dominance, include the elements of platform power, broaden the analytical dimension of competition damage, and pay attention to the impact of platform power abuse on the competition process and market structure. In order to avoid inhibiting the incentive of autonomy and damage the value of the platform system itself, it is also necessary to regard the reasonable autonomy as one of the legitimate reasons and clarify its establishment conditions.

Key words: platform power, anti-monopoly law, market dominance position, competition damage