Abstract: Taking China’s private listed companies as samples, this paper empirically examines the impact of actual controllers’ foreign residency rights on corporate debt financing costs. The findings show that if the actual controllers have foreign residency rights, the corporate debt financing costs will be increased, and this kind of effect is more significant in the non-high-tech enterprises, the enterprises with higher control powers, and the enterprises in which the actual controllers also hold the position as chairman of the board. The mechanism analysis shows that the actual controllers with foreign residency rights can affect corporate debt financing costs through the two paths of increasing the actual controllers’ tunneling behaviors and increasing the corporate default risks. In addition, the institutional investors’ holdings can relieve the positive effect of the actual controllers with foreign residency rights on the corporate debt financing costs. This paper can not only extend the researches on the economic consequences of actual controllers with foreign residency rights, but also provide useful policy reference to support the development of private economy.

Key words: private enterprises; actual controller; foreign residency rights; the cost of debt