Abstract: From the perspective of game theory, this paper studies such game cases as the KMRW reputation game between insurance companies and food enterprises, the due diligence game of insurance companies and the game of collusion and violation reports between intermediary agencies and food enterprises. Then it analyzes the game relationship between insurance companies, intermediary agencies and food enterprises during the operation process of food safety liability insurance. The results show that loss of reputation has failed to bring sufficient attention to the food enterprises; besides, it lacks sufficient momentum to maintain reputation, which causes the production of food not meeting the safety standards. The insurance companies should establish reputation measurement mechanism and rewards and punishment mechanism, so as to achieve the purpose of supervision and restriction over food enterprises while enabling the enterprises to obtain reasonable profits. In addition, the insurance companies should also establish an assessment system against intermediary agencies, so as to reduce the probability of their violations.

Key words: food safety liability insurance; supervision; KMRW reputation game