Abstract: Auditors are important factors in the process of corporate control transfer that could determine whether the deal is a success or not. With the corporate control transfer deals from 2007 to 2013 as the research samples, from the perspective of management self-interest motivation, this paper conducts an empirical study of the causes of auditor reputation choice in the corporate control transfer deals. The results indicate that management may manipulate the choice of auditors in the control transfer deals under the influence of self-interest motivation. After full considerations are given to the trust relationship with auditors, the information superiority and the market reaction, management are more inclined to choose the auditors with close reputation in annual audits. Once the management receives the non-standard annual audit report, it will lose its faith in the auditors, ignore the adverse market reaction due to the changes of auditor reputation and concern more about information superiority, and then choose the auditors with lower reputation in the deals. The results of the study can provide theoretical basis for the regulation and supervision of the process of choosing auditors for listed companies.

Key words: management self-interest; auditor reputation; corporate control transfer deals