Abstract: The decision-making of enterprises involved in the anti-dumping charges concerning whether or not to give response or to what degree of participation depends on the tradeoffs between benefits and costs. Based on the dynamic game theory, this paper establishes a dynamic game model of the export enterprises’ decision-making to give response to suits in the context of incomplete information. It quantifies the respondent costs and benefits and constructs a decision-making model for export enterprises to respond to anti-dumping charges based on the “cost-benefit” theory. Taking the price and quantity of export products as standards, it works out the five critical points for export enterprises involved in the charges to make decisions through mathematical derivation. It is thus clear that to quantify the decision-making of responding to anti-dumping charges is the essence for Chinese enterprises to overcome the lack of confidence, avoid being defeated and build efficient mechanisms for responding to anti-dumping charges.

Key words: two antis and one safeguard; response to anti-dumping charges; “cost-benefit” theory; export enterprises