反垄断法下的市场力量分析：权重调校与逻辑重塑

江西财经大学学报 ›› 2025, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (1): 112-126.

反垄断法下的市场力量分析：权重调校与逻辑重塑

江山

对外经济贸易大学法学院,北京 100029

收稿日期:2024-02-26 修回日期:2024-11-17 出版日期:2025-01-25 发布日期:2025-02-05
作者简介:江山,对外经济贸易大学教授,博士生导师,主要从事竞争法、竞争政策与创新政策研究,联系方式jamesjurist@hotmail.com。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“反垄断法解释研究”(20FFXB025)

An Analysis of the Market Power under the Antimonopoly Law: Weight Adjustment and Logic Remodeling

Jiang Shan

University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China

Received:2024-02-26 Revised:2024-11-17 Online:2025-01-25 Published:2025-02-05

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在反垄断法下,市场力量是影响垄断行为是否可以达成、实施和产生实质性市场影响的关键。长期以来,关于市场力量的认知在定量与定性维度的权重上模糊不清,且形成市场力量单向决定竞争影响的固有模式,未能有效指引实践发展。要作出法律解释上的改善,首先,应当廓清市场力量的制度表达,确立市场力量分析规范的内在维度,于定量与定性之间考察市场份额作为指标的意义及其局限;其次,基于数字市场特性,在市场力量分析中吸纳网络效应、锁定效应等关键因素后对传统评估因素作出的权重调校,并确认以竞争影响评估为中心的评估逻辑;最后,应当破除市场力量分析与竞争影响评估的单向决定关系认知,确立二者双向关联的外在逻辑,并据此重塑市场力量分析的规范构造和关键节点。

关键词: 反垄断法, 市场力量, 市场份额, 垄断行为, 数字市场

Abstract: Under the anti-monopoly law, market power is the key to determine whether monopoly behavior can be achieved, implemented and have substantial market impact. For a long time, the cognition of market power has been blurred in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, and has formed an inherent pattern that market power determines the competitive effect as a one-way street, which has failed to guide practical development effectively. To improve the legal interpretation, first of all, we should clarify the institutional expression of market power, establish the internal dimension of the market power evaluation standard, and examine the significance and limitation of market share as an indicator quantitatively and qualitatively. Next, based on the characteristics of the digital market, we should analyze the weight adjustment of traditional evaluation factors after absorbing such key factors as network effect and lock-in effect in market power evaluation, and confirm the logic of evaluation centered on competitive effect analysis. Finally, we should break the conception that the relationship between market power assessment and competitive impact analysis is a one-way street, establish the external logic of two-way correlation between them, and reshape the normative structure and key nodes of market power assessment accordingly.

Key words: anti-monopoly law, market power, market share, monopolistic conduct, digital market

中图分类号:

D922

江山. 反垄断法下的市场力量分析：权重调校与逻辑重塑[J]. 江西财经大学学报, 2025, 0(1): 112-126.

Jiang Shan. An Analysis of the Market Power under the Antimonopoly Law: Weight Adjustment and Logic Remodeling[J]. Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, 2025, 0(1): 112-126.

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