江西财经大学学报 ›› 2018, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (04): 202-.

• • 上一篇    

基于环境库兹涅茨曲线的水环境规制研究

陈 明,邱俊钦   

  1. (江西财经大学 现代经济管理学院,江西 南昌 332020)
  • 发布日期:2021-01-21
  • 作者简介:陈 明,江西财经大学教授,博士,博士生导师,主要从事规制经济学研究,通讯作者联系方式cmqjy2003@163.com;邱俊钦,江西财经大学博士生,现代经济管理学院助教,主要从事规制经济学研究。

Research on Water Environment Regulation Based on Environmental Kuznets Curve

CHEN Ming, QIU Jun-qin   

  1. (Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 332020, China)
  • Published:2021-01-21

摘要: 随着中国城镇化进程加快,以政府投资为主导的水环境治理投资已无法满足日益增长的污水处理需求。通过研究2006-2015年间水环境规制相对效率,运用三方混合策略博弈分析政府、企业与社会公众的纳什均衡点,并实证检验了博弈分析的可靠性。结果表明,中国水环境污染状况存在反复性,呈现轻微的反“N型”,基于水环境规制的利益集团博弈会影响水环境规制效果,因此要加大对企业污水排放的规制及强化对水环境监管部门违规行为的惩罚力度,完善社会监督机制等。

关键词: 环境库兹涅茨曲线,水资源,环境规制

Abstract: With the acceleration of China’s urbanization process, the investment in water environment governance led by government investment has been unable to meet the growing demand for sewage treatment. By studying the relative efficiency of water environment regulation during the period of 2006—2015, this paper makes use of the three-way mixed strategic game to analyze the Nash equilibrium point of governments, enterprises and the social public, then it conducts an empirical test on the reliability of the game analysis. The results show that the pollution situation of water environment in China is repetitive and presents a slight anti-N-type. The game between the interest groups based on water environment regulation will affect the effect of water environment regulation. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the regulation on corporate wastewater discharge, strengthen the punishment intensity on the violations by the water environment supervision departments, and improve social supervision mechanisms.

Key words: environmental Kuznets curve; water resources; environmental regulation