关键词: 在职消费,风险承担,反腐败,国有公司

Abstract: From the perspective of efficiency, the perquisite consumption of the senior managers is regarded as a kind of implicit incentive mechanism, which can help to improve the working efficiency of the senior managers. While from the perspective of agency, it is regarded as the manifestation of the agency conflict between shareholders and the senior managers, which would worsen the corporate performance. From the risk-taking perspective and using the data of the listed companies, the study of this paper reveals that the perquisite consumption of senior managers of the state-owned enterprises reflects the agency conflicts, and that the perquisite consumption cannot enhance the corporate risk-taking capability. However, the anti-corruption policy of the central Party and government can play a positive moderating role between perquisite consumption and risk-taking, which can improve the risk-taking level.

Key words: perquisite consumption; risk-taking; anti-corruption; state-owned enterprises