Research on the Impact of China Security Investor Services Center Exercising Its Rights on Corporate Leverage Manipulation

Abstract

Abstract: The Investor Service Center is a public welfare institution approved and directly managed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. It supervises and urges listed companies to operate in a standardized manner through shareholding and exercising its rights. Based on the hand-collected data on the exercise of China Security Investor Service Centers (CSISC), this paper investigates the impact of CSISC' exercising its rights on firms' leverage manipulation behaviors. Research has found that the exercise of its rights by CSISC can inhibit corporate leverage manipulation. The mechanism tests indicate that the exercise of its rights by CSISC can enhance corporate perception of leverage manipulation risks and strengthen external governance, thereby inhibiting corporate leverage manipulation. The heterogeneity analysis indicates that the exercise of its rights by CSISC through participation in shareholders' meetings can better inhibit corporate leverage manipulation. The inhibitory effect of CSISC's exercise of its rights on corporate leverage manipulation is more pronounced in enterprises with high levels of financing constraints. In governing corporate leverage manipulation, CSISC and the non-controlling major shareholders have a collaborative relationship; when the controlling shareholder is in a weak position in the game, corporate leverage manipulation can be better inhibited. The economic consequence test indicates that the inhibitory effect of CSISC's exercise of its rights on corporate leverage manipulation will reduce the financial risks of enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to further improve the right-exercise system of CSISC and strengthen the supervision of corporate leverage manipulation.

Key words: the exercise of its rights of China Security Investor Service Centers, leverage manipulation, risk perception, governance interactions

CLC Number:

F832.51

Yu Nu-tao, Su Ci, Wang Han, Miao Rui-chen. Research on the Impact of China Security Investor Services Center Exercising Its Rights on Corporate Leverage Manipulation[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2025, 0(8): 139-151.

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