Abstract: The authenticity of information is crucial for the effective functioning of capital markets. Given the variation in the informational content of online investor interactive platforms, this study takes A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2022 as samples and focuses on the more closely watched“value interaction”Q&A. The empirical research reveals that“value interaction”is more likely to stem from opportunistic behaviors by corporate management manipulating information disclosure, rather than professional inquiries by external supervisors. This conclusion is verified from the perspectives of earnings management substitution, regulatory administrative penalties, and future economic consequences. The opportunistic behavior of corporate information manipulation is weaker when there is a higher sensitivity of executive compensation, or when the corporate management has a financial background or overseas experience. Further research reveals that the“value interaction”generated by corporate manipulation of information disclosure can easily permeate into the capital market, resulting in a positive market response, which is difficult to be strictly regulated. The study confirms that online interactive platforms have not fully played their governance role, and the“value interaction”information is not entirely authentic. Therefore, regulatory authorities need to strengthen the scrutiny of the authenticity of corporate responses and enhance the regulation of the qualifications of questioners on networking platforms. Investors need to improve their professional levels and information discernment abilities to fully leverage the supervisory and governance functions of interactive platforms.

Key words: online interaction platform, value interaction, opportunistic behavior, information disclosure