Abstract: Well-designed systems are the key to preventing and resolving risks, but previous studies on the share price collapse risks of the listed companies have neglected the impact of delisting mechanisms on listed companies. Taking the new policy of mandatory delisting of listed companies implemented by China in late 2020 as a quasi-natural experiment, this paperconducts an empirical study by using the samples of the A-share listed companies in the non-financial industry from 2016 to 2022. The findings show that, firstly, after the implementation of the new delisting policy, the number of the exited A share listed companies has increased significantly; on average, the risk of stock price collapse has been suppressed, which is more obvious in the companies with positive net profit. Secondly, the restriction of the new delisting policy with stricter standards on the space for the manipulation of share price information has increased the information content of the share price, which is an important channel to reduce the risks of share price collapse; while the share-holding of the management is also conductive to suppressing the risks of share price collapse. Thirdly, the effect of the new policy is affected by the differences among the listed companies, the inhibiting effect of the new delisting rule on the risks of share price collapse is more pronounced in the enterprises that are non-state-owned, that are located in the highly centralized industries, that with weak external supervision, and that with higher internal governance level. The above conclusions suggest that to smooth the delisting mechanism for the listed companies is conductive to restricting share price volatility resulted from the collapses. Therefore, strengthening external supervision, optimizing internal governance, reducing information asymmetry are the important paths for the companies with non-ideal performance to reduce the risks of their stock price collapse.

Key words: new delisting rules, stock price crash risk, information asymmetry, agency problem