Contemporary Finance & Economics ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7): 69-81.

• Modern Finance • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Approval System Reform and Corporate Equity Value

FU Wen-ji1, GUI He-fa2, WANG Hong-jian2   

  1. 1. Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872;
    2. Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330031, China
  • Received:2023-02-16 Revised:2023-04-25 Online:2023-07-15 Published:2023-09-13

Abstract: This paper conducts an empirical study based on the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in China and incorporating the approval system reform into the real options analytical framework. The findings show that, firstly, the approval system reform can strengthen the motivation of corporate capital seeking profit, i.e., when faced with good investment opportunities, the approval system reform can induce firms to expand investment and execute growth options in a timely manner; when faced with poor investment opportunities, the approval system reform can induce firms to scale down investment and execute liquidation options in a timely manner; when faced with poor investment opportunities, the reform of the approval system can prompt firms to scale down their investments and execute liquidation options. Secondly, the reform of the approval system can promote the increase of corporate growth option value and liquidation option value. The extensibility tests show that the reinforcing effect of the approval system reform on firms’ capital-seeking-profitmotivation is more significant in the samples with more volatile investment opportunity information and downstream firms (i.e., the investment opportunity information is more dispersed). In terms of the path of action, firstly, the approval system reform can significantly reduce the time entrepreneurs spend on non-productive activities such as dealing with the government and increase the time entrepreneurs spend on business management; secondly, the approval system reform can significantly reduce the investment approval time of enterprises; thirdly, the empirical test based on the database of Chinese industrial enterprises shows that the approval system reform has significantly increased the degree of regional competition. The above findings imply that the government departments should continue to deepen the reform of the approval system and attach great importance to the important role played by information in the process of government decentralization, so as to continuously help enterprises achieve high-quality development.

Key words: motivation of capital pursuing profit, administrative licensing centers, option value, degree of information dispersion

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