Commercial Credit Distortion and Stock Price Crash Risks: Evidences Based on Large Customers Defaulting on Payments to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

Abstract

Abstract: Being in arrears is a major obstacle to the high-quality development of the medium-sized enterprises. Taking China’s small and medium-sized listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as samples, this paper examines the impact of commercial credit distortions on share price collapse risks. It is found that with the increase of the amount owed by large customers, the risks of future stock price collapse of small and medium-sized listed companies are significantly increasing. The reason lies in that commercial credit distortion would raise the earnings management level of SMEs, thereby the risk of stock price collapse will be increased. The results of further study show that when the accounting conservatism of the company is improved, the positive correlation between the large customer arrears and the risk of stock price collapse will be somewhat weakened; while the excessive supply of company commercial credit would further intensify the positive impact of the large customer arrears on the risk of stock price collapse. Therefore, the state should further strengthen the rectification of commercial credit distortion, improve the information disclosure level of the SMEs, and reduce the risks of stock price collapse of SMEs.

Key words: commercial credit distortion, large customer arrears, stock price crash risks, earnings management

CLC Number:

F275.1

ZHOU Chen-Song. Commercial Credit Distortion and Stock Price Crash Risks: Evidences Based on Large Customers Defaulting on Payments to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2022, 0(6): 89-99.

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