Controlling Shareholders'Equity Pledge, Reductionof Taxes and Fees and thePhenomenon of High Cost of Real Enterprises

Abstract

Abstract: Under the present background of“high cost”of entity enterprises and thereductionof taxes and fees, this paper takes the data of A-share entity enterprises from 2012 to 2020 as research samples to empirically test the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the cost stickiness of entity enterprises and the influencing mechanism based on the organizational legitimacy theory and the agency theory. It also explores the regulating effectof the reduction of taxes and fees in it. The findings show that the controlling shareholders' equity pledge has significantly intensified the cost stickiness of real enterprises and that tax cuts and fee reductions have relieved the positive effect of the controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the cost stickiness of real enterprises. It is found from the mechanism test that during the period of equity pledge, the controlling shareholderswill influence the cost stickiness mainly out of legal intention rather than hollowing out intention. The reduction of taxes and fees can help to ease the legal intention of the controlling shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to endow the real enterprise with certain regulation legality and strengthen the supervision of equity pledge.

Key words: controlling shareholder, equity pledge, cost stickiness, reduction of taxes and fees, legitimacy

CLC Number:

F275.1

XIN Chun-hua, ZHANG Xiao-yu, ZU Nan-nan. Controlling Shareholders'Equity Pledge, Reductionof Taxes and Fees and thePhenomenon of High Cost of Real Enterprises[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2022, 0(10): 137-148.

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