Can the Review-Inquiry Letter of Sci-Tech Innovation Board Improve the Level of Information Disclosure on Key Items?

Abstract

Abstract: Companies that are to be listed on the Sci-tech Innovation Board have to accept non-administrative punishment supervision of Shanghai Stock Exchange by means of review and inquiries. Therefore, this paper takes 215 Sci-tech Innovation Board companies listed from July 22, 2019 to December 31, 2020 as the research objects and takes the first review and inquiry letter from Shanghai Stock Exchange that they received during the IPO process as research samples to analyze the characteristics of the subject matters of the review and inquire letters by employing the LDA subject analysis tool. It also empirically studies the relationship between the subject characteristics of the review and inquire letters and the improvement of the level of information disclosure on key items. The findings show that the stronger the review and inquiry related to key issues in the process of IPO issuance and listing, the higher the level of information disclosure of key matters in the registration draft of the prospectus of the proposed listed company compared to the declaration draft, and the stronger the improvement of information disclosure level by the review and inquiry on the companies with poorer corporate governance.

Key words: sci-tech innovation board registration system, subjects of the review and inquiry, information of key items, corporate governance

CLC Number:

F275.5

JIANG Yao-ming, ZHANG Lei-yun. Can the Review-Inquiry Letter of Sci-Tech Innovation Board Improve the Level of Information Disclosure on Key Items?[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(9): 126-136.

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