Abstract: Non-controlling shareholders can restrain the controlling shareholders or management from hiding bad news, and also can form a channel of interest transmission through collusion, which are crucial to the maintenance of the economic order of the capital market. From the perspective of stock price collapse, this paper examines the impact of non-controlling shareholders’ network power on collapse risks. The findings show that the greater the non-controlling shareholders’ network power, the more likely they can reduce the stock price collapse risks. The result of the mechanism analysis indicates that non-controlling shareholders’ network power can reduce stock price collapse risks through the embedding effect and the governance effect, the former restrains the share price collapse risks through the embedding effect of network information relationship and structure, while the latter restrains the share price collapse risks through the governance effect of the tunneling behaviors of controlling shareholders and the covering behaviors of the management.

Key words: non-controlling shareholders’ network power;, embedding effect, governance effect, stock price collapse risk