The Negative Externality of Zombie Companies’ Occupation of Bank Credit: From the Perspective of Commercial Credit

Abstract

Abstract: To duly handle the relationship between zombie companies and each interest subject is the top priority in the supply side structural reform. Taking the A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 as samples, this paper studies the negative externality of bank credit funds occupied by zombie companies from the perspective of commercial credit. The findings show that the more credit resources that zombie companies occupy in the financial market, the more commercial credit funds that they occupy in the product factor market. Compared to downstream customers, the above-mentioned impact is more significant for upstream suppliers of the zombie companies. The results of further analysis show that the higher the asset specificity that the zombie companies have and the higher the industry concentration of the industry that the zombie companies are in, the more serious the commercial credit occupied by them. The findings of the mechanism test indicate that the negative externality of the zombie companies’ occupation of bank credit funds to upstream and downstream companies are caused by the low transparency of the zombie companies’ information and their insufficient solvency.

Key words: zombie companies, bank credit, commercial credit, negative externality

CLC Number:

F275.1

ZHANG Dong, ZHAO Wen-zhuo. The Negative Externality of Zombie Companies’ Occupation of Bank Credit: From the Perspective of Commercial Credit[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2021, 0(3): 124-135.

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