Abstract: The budget revenue of China’s government-managed funds has a long-standing systemic problem of deviations between budget and final accounts, which would lead to serious discounts on the legitimacy, normativity, scientificity and binding force of the government budget. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance the researches on the deviation degree between the budget and the final accounts of government-managed funds revenue and to analyze the major reasons and propose strategies to solve the practical problems. By making use of the panel data of 31 provincial level local governments in China’s mainland from 2010 to 2017, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of the deviation degree between the budget and the final accounts of government-managed funds revenue, as well as its causes. The findings show that the budget of China’s local government-managed funds has a systematic over-collection problem. Motivated by political promotions, China’s local officials would pursue high-speed GDP growth and strategically underestimate the expected GDP growth, which would lay the economic foundation for the budget over-collection of government-managed funds. The opportunistic motivation and the strategic behavior of the local governments are the deep-seated institutional causes of the excessive deviations between the budget and the final accounts of government-managed funds revenue. Therefore, while paying more attention to the budget management of government-managed funds, it is necessary not only to improve the level of budget management from the technological level, but also to change fundamentally the incentive and constrain mechanism on the officials of local governments, so as to completely solve the excessive deviations between the budget and the final accounts of government-managed funds revenue.

Key words: government-managed funds budget, deviations between budget and final accounts, budget excess, incentive of political promotion