Creditor Supervision and Earnings Management of Listed Companies: From the Perspective of Debt Default Risks

Abstract

Abstract: This paper makes use of the debt default risks calculated with KMV model to measure the creditors’ supervisory power. Then it uses the data of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 to study the relationship between debt default risk and accrued earnings management and real earnings management. The findings show that the higher the debt default risk of a listed company, the lower its level of accrual earnings management and real earnings management will be; compared with state-owned enterprises, the external supervision of creditors has a more significant restraining effect on the two types of earnings management of private enterprises. Further research finds that creditor supervision can reduce the degree of downward profit adjustment by manipulating real earnings management in listed companies.

Key words: debt default risk, accrued earnings management, real earnings management

CLC Number:

F275.4

LI Shi-yao, LI Xing-han, GUAN Chao. Creditor Supervision and Earnings Management of Listed Companies: From the Perspective of Debt Default Risks[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2020, 0(2): 138-148.

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